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Abstract
The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer
voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our
efforts to adapt Prêt à Voter to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of
Victoria. This technical report includes general background, user experience and details
of the cryptographic protocols and human processes. We explain the problems, present
solutions, then analyse their security properties and explain how they tie in to other
design decisions. We hope this will be an interesting case study on the application of
end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to real elections.
The prior version of this Technical Report was published on arXiv on the 17th Septem-
ber 2014. This version has been updated with an account of the election run. This is
the extended version of our paper [CRST15]. The source code is available at https:
//bitbucket.org/vvote/
The team involved in developing the vVote design described in this report were: Craig
Burton, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Rui Joaquim, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider
and Vanessa Teague.
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1. Introduction
The potential advantages of electronic voting are obvious but the risks are not. The
challenge is to obtain the obvious advantages for convenience and accessibility while
preserving reasonable vote privacy and producing a rigorous evidence trail that will
stand up to dispute.
This paper details a design for end-to-end verifiable voting in the Australian state of
Victoria, based on the Prêt à Voter end-to-end verifiable voting system [RBH+09]. The
system ran successfully in the state election in Victoria (Australia) in November 2014,
taking a total of 1121 votes from supervised polling places inside Victoria and overseas.
The proposed protocol is end-to-end verifiable, meaning that there are no human or
electronic components which must be trusted for guaranteeing the integrity of the votes
(although vision impaired voters must assume that at least one device reads accurately
to them). There are probabilistic assumptions about the number of voters who confirm
correct printing of some Prêt à Voter ballots, the number who check that their printout
matches their intended vote, and the number who check that their receipt appears on
the Web Bulletin Board (WBB). It also provides voters with evidence of malfeasance,
assuming that they check the signature on their receipt before they leave the polling
station. Since this is a polling-station scheme, we do not address eligibility verifiability.
Prevention of ballot stuffing is by existing procedural mechanisms.
1.1. End-to-end verifiability
End-to-end verifiability consists of three pieces of evidence:
Cast-as-intended verification: Each voter gets evidence that their vote is cast as they
intended,
Counted-as-cast verification: Each voter gets evidence that their vote is included un-
altered in the tally,
Universally verifiable tallying: Everyone can check that the list of (encrypted) cast
votes produces the announced election outcome.
This project does not achieve verifiability all the way to the announcement of the
election result, because it runs alongside an existing paper-based system that does not
provide a universally verifiable tallying proof. Nevertheless we believe there are signific-
ant advantages to using an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system for part of an
election. See 1.5 for more details. In summary, the vVote system provides
• cast-as-intended verification,
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• counted-as-cast verification and
• an output list of votes, with a universally verifiable proof.
Other forms of electronic voting (or indeed of paper-based voting) might provide some,
but not all, of these properties. For example, some Australian states offer a simple
electronic ballot marker, in which the voter uses a computer to help them fill in, and
then print, a ballot that is put into a ballot box and counted along with the ballots
that are completed manually. This provides cast-as-intended verification for sighted
voters, because the voter can look at their printed ballot and check that it reflects their
intention. It does not provide counted-as-cast verification, instead relying on procedures
for the secure transport of paper ballots (like the paper system does). It delegates tallying
verification to scrutineers who observe the paper count (if there is one).
The VEC opted for Prêt à Voter over the simpler alternative of a plain electronic
ballot marker because it provides for electronic transfer of ballot information from distant
supervised locations, supported by verifiable evidence of correctness. This was regarded
as particularly important for distant polling places (e.g. overseas) and for allowing any
voter to vote at any polling place. Since this project commenced, a problem in the
transport of West Australian Senate ballot papers in the 2013 federal election has focused
national attention on the security of processes for transporting paper ballots.
1.2. Prêt à Voter overview
Prêt à Voter uses a ballot form that is printed before voting, with a list of candidates
printed in a random order, and an encrypted version of the same list. Voters select
or number the candidates by filling in boxes adjacent to the candidate names (in the
Victorian protocol, they will have computerised assistance). They keep the list of marked
boxes and the encrypted candidate list, and shred the human-readable candidate list. The
two main properties of Prêt à Voter are privacy and end-to-end verifiability.
End-to-end verifiability is achieved in vVote, following the Prêt à Voter structure, as
follows:
Cast-as-intended verification:
• ballot printing confirmation Each voter has the opportunity to confirm
that the printed candidate lists on some ballots match the encrypted version
on the same ballot.
• preference printing confirmation Each voter writes their own prefer-
ences (or in the case of vVote, checks that their own preferences are correctly
written) on the other side of the ballot.
Counted-as-cast verification: Each voter gets the opportunity to check that their (en-
crypted) ballot appears in a public list of received votes,
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Universally verifiable tallying: Everyone can check that the list of (encrypted) cast
votes produces the announced output votes, by downloading and checking a public
electronic proof.
1.3. Necessary procedures
Academic papers can simply state the assumptions under which the protocol is secure;
practical deployments must ensure that those assumptions are met, or the system may
not protect privacy or provide evidence of a correct election result. This technical report
details the procedures that need to be followed in order for the system to attain the
verifiability and privacy properties necessary for state elections.
End-to-end verification depends on voters performing proper procedures for verify-
ing that their vote is cast as they intended and included in the count. All voters must be
explicitly encouraged to perform some ballot confirmations on the printed ballots before
voting, to check that the computer-assisted preference list matches their intended vote,
and to look up their vote later on the public list of accepted votes. If the announced
election outcome is disputed, then the evidence supporting it depends crucially on the
number and distribution of these confirming procedures that were actually performed.
For example, if there is one polling place in which voters were not informed of the ballot
confirmation procedure, then all of the votes cast at that polling place lack any supporting
evidence.
Privacy depends on the immediate destruction of the human-readable candidate list.
Unlike ordinary completed ballots, the human-readable candidate lists also include a
unique serial number that matches the one on the voter’s receipt. Hence the candidate
lists prove how individuals voted. Shredding the candidate list must be enforced at all
polling places, immediately after the person votes.
1.4. The protocol
End-to-end verifiable election protocols are well studied in the academic literature, but
until recently have not been deployed in public elections. In 2011 the Victorian Elect-
oral Commission (VEC) approached the Prêt à Voter team to investigate adapting the
scheme to the special requirements of the Victorian parliamentary elections, which use
both Instant Runoff Voting (IRV, also called “alternative vote” in the UK, and simply
“preferential voting” in Australia) and 5-seat Single Transferable Vote (STV)1. The first
version of the final system has been recently delivered to the VEC at the time of writing,
and a process of testing and review will soon be underway. This document is intended
as an aid for testing, review and security analysis. The system is expected to be ready
for the next Victorian State election in November 2014.
The proposed protocol is universally verifiable, meaning that there are no hardware,
software, or human components that must be trusted for guaranteeing the integrity of
1For more information on various election methods, please refer to the appendix in [XCH+10].
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the votes.2 There are probabilistic assumptions about the number of voters who confirm
correct printing of some Prêt à Voter ballots, the number who check that their printout
matches their intended vote, and the number who check that their receipt appears on
the Web Bulletin Board (WBB). It also provides voters with evidence of malfeasance,
assuming that they check the signature on their receipt before they leave the polling
station.
Since this is a polling-station scheme, we do not address eligibility verifiability. Pre-
vention of ballot stuffing is by existing procedural mechanisms.
The main departure from standard Prêt à Voter is the use of a computer to assist the
user in completing the ballot. This is referred to as an “electronic ballot marker” (EBM).
The EBM is trusted for vote privacy, which is different from standard Prêt à Voter in
which the voter does not need to communicate her vote to any (encryption) device. This
modification is necessary for usability, because a vote can consist of a permuted list of
about 30 candidates. It seemed infeasible for a voter to fill in a Prêt à Voter ballot
form without assistance. Indeed, simply filling in an ordinary paper ballot with about
30 preferences is a difficult task.3 Computerised assistance is an important benefit of the
project, and trusting the device for privacy seemed an almost unavoidable result of that
usability advantage.4 Hence our scheme depends on stronger privacy assumptions than
standard Prêt à Voter. Providing privacy for complex ballots is notoriously difficult, and
is further complicated by some details of Victorian elections that are described below.
Our system provides privacy and receipt-freeness under reasonable assumptions about
the correct randomised generation and careful deletion of secret data, and of course
assuming a threshold of decryption key sharers do not collude. It does not fully defend
against the “Italian Attack,” or all other subtle coercion issues, but neither does the
current paper-based system. We make this more precise below.
1.5. Challenges of Victorian Voting
Prêt à Voter was designed originally for first-past-the post voting, in which each voter
chose a single candidate [CRS05]. Subsequent papers extended the scheme to more
complex types of elections [RS06, Rya08, RBH+09, XCH+10].
The state of Victoria, like many other Australian states, runs simultaneous elections
for two houses of parliament, the Legislative Assembly (LA) and the Legislative Council
(LC), both of which use ranked-choice voting. Each LA representative is elected by
IRV with compulsory complete preference listing, with rarely more than 10 candidates.
2Vision impaired voters must assume that at least one device reads accurately to them.
3Since some people deliberately vote informally, it is difficult to say exactly what percentage of people
accidentally disenfranchise themselves by incorrectly filling in their vote. About 2% of votes in
the 2006 state election were ruled informal because of “numbering errors” [Vic07] , but the overall
informality rate is closer to 10%, especially when there are lots of candidates on the ballot. See
https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/Results/stateby2012distributionMelbourneDistrict.html for
an example.
4In principle one could use an EBM to fill in a series of ballots and only cast one of them, without
telling the device which one. This is too much work for voters.
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Members of the Legislative Council (LC) are elected in 5-member electorates using STV.
Voters typically choose from among about 30 candidates—they rank at least 5, and up
to all candidates in their order of preference.
Because LC voting is quite complex, voters are offered a shorthand called “Above the
line” (ATL) voting, which allows them to select a complete preference ranking chosen
by their favourite political group (usually a party). Each political group (of which there
are about 12) registers a (complete) STV vote in advance with the electoral commission.
When someone votes ATL and chooses that group’s ticket, this is equivalent to copying
out their STV vote.
Traditionally, both LC voting options are presented on the same ballot paper. The
ATL group selections are presented on top of a thick line (hence the name); the full STV
options are shown below the line (and hence called “below the line” (BTL) votes).
Each polling place must accept votes from a resident of anywhere in the state. Hence
our system must produce Prêt à Voter ballots for every electoral division in both the LA
and the LC, available at every polling place. This is a significant challenge for Prêt à
Voter, but Prêt à Voter confers the great advantage of verifiability on these votes. The
existing methods of verifiable paper counting do not work with this requirement. For the
large fraction of people who vote outside their home electorate, completed paper ballots
must be sent to the home electorate by courier, usually arriving after the polling-station
count has been completed and after observers have departed.
This system will not be responsible for all of the votes cast in the upcoming state
election, so it will have to combine with existing procedures for casting and counting
ordinary paper ballots. For LA and LC-ATL votes this is straightforward. However, LC-
BTL votes are complicated. Even those cast on paper must be tallied electronically—
in the existing system they are manually entered and then electronically tallied. The
authorities then make complete vote data available to allow observers to check the count.5
This is why the system does not achieve a complete universally verifiable tally. The proof
that this system produces would be sufficient for end-to-end verifiability if it carried all
votes in the election, but it is not possible to do STV tallying (whether verifiable or not)
on a subset of votes. As it is, the scrutineers who observe the paper count will have to
check that the publicly verifiable output from vVote matches the votes that are added
to the paper count.
Preferential elections are vulnerable to coercion through signature attacks [DC07],
commonly referred to as Italian attacks. The system proposed here does not address this
attack, primarily because it will work alongside a paper system that is also susceptible
to it. Our system also reveals whether a person voted ATL or BTL. This is unlikely to
have political consequences.
Another challenge is producing an accessible solution for voters who cannot fill out a
paper ballot unassisted. This is a primary justification for the project, but producing
a truly verifiable solution for such voters is extremely difficult, because many of them
cannot perform the crucial check that the printout matches their intention (though see
[CHPV09] for a verifiable and accessible protocol). We provide a way for them to use any
5These procedures are also under review and improvement, but are out of the scope of this paper.
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other machine in the polling place to do the check, in which case the cast-as-intended
property depends upon at least one of the machines in the polling station not colluding
with the others to manipulate the vote.
1.6. Specific design choices
1.6.1. Cast-as-intended verification
Wombat [BNFL+12], VoteBox [SDW08] and several other polling-station end-to-end veri-
fiable voting schemes guarantee integrity by using “Benaloh challenges,” [Ben06] which
require filling in the vote more than once. This would be time-consuming for 30-candidate
STV. It would perhaps be possible to make challenges easier (for example, by letting the
device remember the last vote), but the integrity guarantees still depend on the voter
performing quite a subtle randomised protocol. We have opted for Prêt à Voter, in which
voters may confirm the correctness of the unvoted ballot form. This confirmation process
(called “auditing” in older versions) can be completed with assistance without comprom-
ising privacy, because it occurs before the person votes. It does not require the voter
to redo their (possibly quite complicated) vote. It also provides dispute resolution and
some accountability: there is no need to take the voter’s word for how they voted. A
ballot confirmation check that completes with an invalid proof can be used as evidence;
an attempted ballot confirmation check that does not complete at all can have multiple
(human) witnesses.
Ballot confirming is separate from voting, so additional ballot confirming by inde-
pendent observers would be a convenient and practical addition to voter-initiated ballot
confirmations. It would be easy for polling-place observers to see that the confirmation
process did not involve casting any votes. (Wombat, StarVote and some other systems
also separate the process of generating an encrypted vote from casting it.)
These processes are additive in the sense that they do not interfere with each other:
the audits and inferences associated with particular trust assumptions are not affected
by other audits based on different trust assumptions.
1.6.2. Unified Scanner and EBM
We have already described why completing the ballot needs to be assisted by a computer.
Our original design [BCH+12a] included separate steps for filling in the ballot and then
scanning the printed receipt. This was designed to separate the information of how
the person voted from the knowledge of what their receipt looked like: the EBM learnt
how the person voted, but could not subsequently recognise their ballot (and hence link
it to the individual voter), while the scanner knew the receipt but did not know the
corresponding plaintext. However, user studies at the VEC determined that a three-
step voting process was too cumbersome for use. Also the necessity of print-on-demand
meant that there was already an Internet-connected machine in the polling place that
was trusted for maintaining privacy of the information on the printed ballot, including
which candidate ordering corresponded to which receipt. For both these reasons, the new
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protocol now unifies the job of the scanner and the EBM, though it retains a separate
print-on-demand step. The voter first collects their ballot form, and has an opportunity
to perform a confirmation check on it, then goes to an EBM to fill in the ballot, then
the EBM sends the receipt electronically and also prints a paper record for the voter to
check. This now means there are two online manchines in the polling place (the EBMs
and the ballot printers) that are trusted for vote privacy.
1.6.3. Print on Demand
This project necessitated a new protocol for the verifiable printing on demand of Prêt
à Voter ballot forms. The crucial requirement is that voters (and others) can perform
a confirmation check on some ballot forms for correctness without compromising voter
privacy, because the check occurs before the person votes. Voters then vote on ballot
forms that have not had a confirmation check. Ballot forms that have had a confirmation
check cannot be voted on because their associated ciphertexts have now been decrypted,
and privacy would be lost on such votes.
The integrity of Prêt à Voter depends crucially on proper construction of the printed
ballot forms, meaning that the plaintext candidate list that the voter sees must match the
encrypted values for that ballot. This technical report details opportunities for confirming
their correct construction and printing. The construction is very computationally efficient
and retains most of the desirable properties of existing print-on-demand proposals in
the literature. The information flow of our scheme is similar to Markpledge 2 [AN06],
though the confirming is different. The main idea is that the device encrypts the vote
directly using randomness generated by others. The protocol was first presented in JETS
[CHJ+13].
Also the system must address the question of “kleptographic” privacy attacks [GKK+06],
in which the (public) ciphertexts contain deliberately poorly-chosen randomness that ex-
poses the vote. This is possible whenever the entity building the ciphertexts also controls
all the randomness used. This problem is addressed by distributing the process of input-
ting randomness into ciphertexts.
This proposal is designed so that the entity that builds the ciphertexts (the printer) has
a deterministic algorithm to follow. This provides a way to distribute the expensive cryp-
tographic operations to the network of printers, whilst retaining the central, distributed,
generation of randomness to maintain the following three properties:
• ensuring the candidate lists are randomly generated,
• ensuring no single generating entity knows all the (plaintext) candidate lists, and
• ensuring extra information about the candidate list cannot be leaked in the ballot
ciphertexts (as in kleptographic attacks ).
We then devise a confirming mechanism to ensure correctness of the printed ballot
forms.
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1.6.4. Randomised Partial Checking
The exact choice of mixnet is independent of other aspects of the protocol, but in this im-
plementation we have selected a mixnet based on Randomised Partial Checking [JJR02].
This was partly due to efficiency, and partly to the ease of explaining to the public how
the mixnet works.
However, improvements in both the implementation and the efficiency of zero-knowledge
shuffling proofs [TW10, FS01, Nef01] could make them a reasonable alternative in future
versions. In theory they have superior properties, because their privacy and soundness
are stronger, can be proven formally, and rely on weaker assumptions than those of RPC.
However, they remain computationally intensive and difficult to explain.
1.7. Related Work
In the USA, permanent paper records such as Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT)
or opscans are a common means of achieving software independence [Riv08]. However,
this does not solve the problem of secure custody and transport of the paper trail. Fur-
thermore, performing rigorous risk-limiting audits seems intractable for IRV [MRSW11],
let alone for 30-candidate STV.
The most closely related project is the groundbreaking use of Scantegrity II in binding
local government elections in Takoma Park, MD [CCC+10]. Our project has very similar
privacy and verifiability properties. However, both the overall election size and the
complexity of each ballot are greater for our system. Although the Scantegrity II scheme
appears to have been highly successful in the context of the Takoma Park elections,
Prêt à Voter is more appropriate for our application. Scantegrity II is inherently for
single-candidate selections. It has been adapted to IRV in Takoma Park by running a
separate single-candidate election for each preference, but would be difficult to adapt to
30-candidate preference lists. Even with computer assistance, a 30 by 30 grid of invisible
ink bubbles seems too complicated for most voters.
The STAR-Vote project proposed for Travis County, TX [BBB+13] represents an
interesting combination of end-to-end verification techniques and risk limiting audits.
STAR-Vote retains a human-readable paper record for auditing purposes alongside the
end-to-end verifiable cryptographic data. Cast-as-intended verification of the end-to-end
verifiable part is achieved by a novel interpretation of Benaloh’s simple challenge pro-
cess [Ben06], in which voters can choose either to cast their ballot into a special ballot
box or to spoil it and start again. We hope our observations might be helpful in the final
stages of the STAR-Vote design process.
1.8. Prior work and paper overview
In a previous paper [BCH+12a] we gave an overview of this project, including the con-
text of Victorian voting and some ideas about how we would implement the protocol. A
followup version [BCH+12b] gave more details and some preliminary security analysis.
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The print on demand protocol was presented in [CHJ+13]. Here we present all of the
protocol, including both the cryptographic protocol and the human procedures to be
followed in the polling place and at the electoral commission. Our aim is for a compre-
hensive analysis of the protocol’s security, including the assumptions on which privacy
depends, a precise explanation of the kind of verifiability achieved, and a clear statement
of the issues that remain.
An overview including the main system components and an account of the voting
experience is contained in Section 2, which includes a statement of the main security
claims. Many of the system’s security properties depend on proper procedures in the
polling place—these are detailed in Section 3. The individual system components are
described in Section 4. Section 5 contains mechanisms for achieving robustness in the
presence of certain failures. A comprehensive and rigorous threat analysis is contained
in Section 6.
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2. System Overview
2.1. System Components
The system has the following main components:
Public Web Bulletin Board (Public WBB): an authenticated public broadcast chan-
nel with memory.
Private Web Bulletin Board (Private WBB): a robust secure database which receives
messages, performs basic validity checks, and returns a signature. Validly signed
messages are guaranteed, under certain assumptions, to appear subsequently on
the Public WBB.
Print-on-demand printer: a combination of a computer and printer which generates
Prêt à Voter ballots in advance of the election, then prints them on demand.
Randomness Generation Service: a collection of servers that produce randomness for
the print on demand process.
Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM): a computer that assists the user in filling in a Prêt
à Voter ballot.
Cancel Station: a supervised interface for cancelling a vote that has not been properly
submitted or has not received a valid Private WBB signature.
Mixnet: a set of (preferably independently managed and hosted) Mix servers that pro-
duces a noninteractive, universally verifiable proof of a shuffle and decryption (of
encrypted votes) and posts it to the Public WBB.
Election key sharers: authorities who share the key used to decrypt votes at the end
of the election.
2.2. Voter Experience Overview
This section gives an overview of the verification process, listing all the steps for a voter
to verify that their vote is cast as they intended and properly included in the count, and
also the process for universal verification of the output.
Recall that voters cast an IRV vote for a Legislative Assembly district and then for
their Legislative Council region either a full STV vote or an ’ATL’ shorthand. (See
Section 1.5). A printed ballot therefore consists of:
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• A human-readable serial number (shortened to SerialNumber below),
• a human-readable district name (which also determines the region),
• a human-readable randomly ordered list of the candidate names for the LA district,
• a human-readable randomly ordered list of the candidate names for the LC region,
• a human-readable list of group names (for LC-ATL voting),
• a QR code containing all this data, plus a WBB digital signature on it.
Three races: a named district race and the two exclusively votable parts of the region
race (a group-list vote or voting for individual candidates) A list of candidate names for
the District and candidate voting part of the region race A list of group names for the
group-list part of the region race
Figure 2.1 shows the ballot form on the left side, and also the preferences as printed
out by the EBM. The process for receiving the ballot form, then casting a vote on it
while verifying that the vote matches the voter’s intention, is as follows:
Pollworker: authenticates the voters (using whatever method is traditional) and sends
a print request to the Print On Demand device specifying the district/region they
can vote in,1
Printer: retrieves and prints appropriate ballot, including SerialNumber and district,
with private WBB signature.2
Voter (Check 1): may choose to check and confirm this ballot. This involves demand-
ing a proof that the ballot is properly formed, i.e. that the permuted candidate list
corresponds correctly to the ciphertexts on the public WBB for that serial number.
If the ballot has a confirmation check, the voter returns to the printing step for a
new ballot.
Voter: shows the printed ballot barcode to the EBM, then enters the vote via user-
friendly EBM interface,
EBM: prints on a separate sheet:
1. the electoral district,
2. the SerialNumber,
3. the voter preferences permuted appropriately to match Prêt à Voter ballot,
4. a QR code with this data, plus private WBB signature.
This is the voter’s receipt. An example is shown on the right side of Figure 2.1.
1More generally, it is the pollworkers’ responsibility to authenticate the voter, request the ballot(s) that
the person is eligible to vote on, and record how many people voted for each division.
2Details on what is signed and how are in Section 4.2
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Voter (Check 2): checks printed preferences against printed candidate list, and checks
that the district is correct and the SerialNumber matches that on the ballot form.
Voter (Check 3): (optionally) checks the WBB signature, which covers only data visible
to the voter. This requires an electronic device.
If either of Check 2 or 3 fails, the vote is cancelled using the cancellation protocol of
Section 3.1.4.
Voter: shreds the candidate list,
Voter: leaves the polling place.
Voter (Check 4): later checks their vote on the public WBB. They only need to check
the serial number and order of their preference numbers.
Anyone (Check 5): after polling closes, checks the universally verifiable proof that all
submitted votes are properly shuffled and decrypted.
The rest of this Technical Report expands on each of these steps so as to give a complete
account of end to end verification and an analysis of privacy.
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Figure 2.1.: Separate vote printouts (truncated at the bottom). The voter collects the
left side (the candidate list) when they are marked off. The EBM then prints
the right side with the voter’s preferences. Note the matching serial numbers.
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2.3. Security Properties
The intention is to provide a proof of integrity independent of any trusted hardware,
software or people, while preserving reasonable privacy.
We have several different kinds of security assumptions, which apply at different points:
Computational assumption: A reduction to a computational problem generally be-
lieved to be hard. For example, the privacy of ElGamal encryption relies on the
hardness of the Decision Diffie Helmann problem on the elliptic curve being used.
The soundness of the zero knowledge proofs of correct decryption, which use the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic, relies on the assumption that inverting the hash function is
as hard as inverting a random oracle.
Auditing assumption: An assumption that a sufficiently large and unpredictable frac-
tion of a set have been confirmed or checked. For example, proper ballot genera-
tion, proper ballot printing, and accurate printing of voter preferences all need to
be checked with high enough probability and unpredictability to give us confidence
in the accuracy of those that were not checked.
Threshold or distributed assumption: An assumption that a known threshold of au-
thorities will not misbehave. For example, votes on the public WBB are private
as long as fewer than a threshold of the authorities who share the decryption key
collude, and not all the mixers collude. Robustness and reliability of the private
WBB are also dependent on threshold assumptions. The design requires a threshold
greater than 2/3 of the number of peers. For example, if there are 7 peers then a
suitable threshold is 5.
Individual trust assumption: Trusting a single device. For example, the EBM a person
uses to vote is trusted not to leak the vote. The printer is trusted not to leak ballot
information.
Obviously, the intention is to minimise instances of trusting a single device. Our system
design aims to provide
Integrity based only on computational or auditing assumptions. If a sufficient num-
ber of confirmation checks are properly conducted then the election’s integrity is
demonstrated given only computational assumptions.3
Non-repudiation based on a threshold assumption. Unless more than a threshold of
private WBB peers collude, it should be infeasible to produce a properly signed
receipt without properly casting a vote.
3The computational assumptions are due only to the use of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to choose chal-
lenges for the proof of a shuffle. An alternative method of generating unpredictable challenges based
on some other assumption could also be used, in which case there would be no computational as-
sumptions for integrity.
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Robustness based on a threshold assumption. If a threshold of private WBB peers
behave properly, a properly signed receipt is guaranteed to appear on the public
WBB.
Privacy is the most subtle property, and needs to be discussed separately at several
points. We assume that the link between an individual and their receipt is public
(though names are not printed on the WBB).
The printer is trusted not to leak ballot information via side channels.
The EBM is trusted not to leak the vote via side channels.
The printer is prevented from performing kleptographic attacks by the ballot gen-
eration confirmation check. The proper generation of randomness for those
ballots depends on at least one of the randomness generation servers being
honest.
The encrypted votes on the WBB remain private under threshold assumptions
on the decryption key sharers and an assumption that there is at least one
honest mix server.
The system does not as it stands defend against pattern-based coercion attacks
(a.k.a. “Italian attacks”), or other subtle coercion techniques such as forced
randomisation.
Verification of voter eligibility is dependent on human procedures: the system is de-
pendent on a secure procedure for ensuring that only eligible voters can vote, with at most
one vote each. We assume that at some point a ledger of how many people have voted
in each division at each polling place is reconciled with the published list of encrypted
votes on the WBB.
We emphasise that for verification purposes all the voters and other observers have
access to the public WBB, which is broadcast on a reliable channel. Hence there are no
human or electronic components which must be trusted for integrity (apart from voter
eligibility and polling-place ballot stuffing).
There are, however, threshold trust assumptions for liveness, reliability, and non-
repudiation. In other words, we rely on certain thresholds to prevent certain kinds
of failures, although all those failures would be detectable even if all the authorites mis-
behaved. (Whether they would in practice be detected might depend on an auditing
assumption.) The private WBB peers provide a robust database implementation that
distributes trust so the electoral authorities will only publish something that is verifiable
as long as the trust assumption holds. Since the authorities are responsible for choosing
the peers to trust, they are responsible for meeting that assumption.
Another way of looking at it is that the voters themselves do not need to trust any
person or software for integrity, because they can verify it. The authorities want to
be confident that what they publish will indeed verify. The design tells the authorities
that, under certain trust assumptions, the system will give them what they need, and
hence satisfy the interested and sceptical members of the public who want to verify the
outcome.
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The confirmation checks involved in verifiability also provide a way of catching bugs or
errors in the software: a failed check might also be due to a coding error, and successful
checks also demonstrate the absence of coding errors that could affect the result of the
election.
The protocol uses digital signatures to provide evidence of many kinds of failures
(in addition to the more traditional end-to-end verifiability literature, which tends to
focus on detection alone). This provides two kinds of benefits: voters can prove that
a malfunction occurred, but not persuade anyone that a malfunction occurred when it
did not. This is important in defending against the “defaming attack” in which people
pretend to have detected a system failure which did not actually happen. Of course,
there can be no proof that the EBM accurately represented the voter’s intention: that
step is dependent on the voter’s testimony and hence is to an extent vulnerable to the
“defaming” attack.
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3. Procedural details
This section details, from the human perspective, how certain important security con-
ditions are enforced by insisting on particular human procedures. (The next chapters
explain how electronic processes guarantee other security properties.) The most import-
ant procedures in the polling place include giving each voter exactly one, correct, ballot,
allowing them to chose some at random to perform a confirmation check on, encouraging
them to check their printed vote and its signature, and insisting that they shred their
candidate list. The procedures and guarantees for vision impaired voters are slightly
different from those for sighted voters, because checking the printout requires the use of
a device.
This chapter describes what checks should be performed to test for normal operation.
Recovery from failures is described in Chapter 5.
3.1. Typical voters
3.1.1. Getting a ballot
The voter presents herself to an official at a polling station and her name is marked off
a register. The official sends the print station a request for a ballot of the appropriate
LA and LC division. The print station prints the ballot with a Private WBB signature.
(Print station is abbreviated as VPS in other documentation.)
It is essential for privacy that no-one except the voter sees the associ-
ation between the candidate order and serial number on the ballot, so
printing should be private.
Obviously it is essential for integrity that each voter is allowed to vote at most once, on
a ballot of the appropriate division. This must be enforced by procedures at the polling
place.
Reconciling the number of marked-off voters in each division with the
number posted on the WBB is essential for preventing ballot stuffing.
Check 1a: Confirming ballot correctness. Once she has obtained her ballot,
the voter should decide whether she wishes to run a confirmation check on it or use it
to vote. A confirmation check, called “auditing” in previous versions of Prêt à Voter,
means checking that the encrypted list of candidates on the WBB matches the plaintext
candidate ordering on the RHS of the ballot. Ballot confirmation ensures that the ballot is
well-formed and hence would correctly encode a vote. We describe the ballot confirmation
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procedure below in Section 3.1.3. She can repeat the ballot confirmation procedure as
many times as she wants in principle, each time obtaining a fresh ballot, until proceeding
to vote using the last obtained, unconfirmed ballot. This implements an iterated cut-
and-choose protocol: not knowing which option the voter will choose before committing
to the printed ballot serves to counter any attempts by the system to manipulate votes by
issuing malformed ballots. Confirming ballot construction necessarily reveals encryption
information, so a ballot that has been confirmed should not be subsequently re-used for
voting.
It is essential for integrity that all voters have the opportunity to per-
form a confirmation check on as many ballots as they wish.
The more voters who check, the stronger the evidence that the ballots are well formed.
Check 1b: Checking the WBB signature on the printed ballot. Each ballot
is printed with a WBB signature to indicate it is legitimate. Voters should check this
signature before voting—if they vote on an illegitimate ballot i.e. one which did not
originate properly from the PoD protocol, their vote will not be accepted and their
privacy could be breached. This does not in itself affect integrity, because an attempt
to deprive a person of a vote by giving them an illegitimate ballot will be detected at
voting time when the WBB refuses to sign their submitted vote.
3.1.2. Casting a vote
Assuming that she is now happy to proceed to casting her vote, the voter takes the
last obtained ballot to the booth. In standard Prêt à Voter she would now proceed to
fill in her preferences directly on the ballot. However, given that the LC-BTL section
contains about 30 candidates, it is not reasonable to expect the voter to enter her ranking
preferences using a permuted candidate list. Instead we propose to use a touch screen
Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM) that will display the candidates in standard order, as
previously introduced in [BCH+12a]. The voter enters her preferences via the screen in
the standard way, then the EBM permutes them to match the candidate permutation on
her ballot. This means that we have to sacrifice one of the pleasing features of standard
Prêt à Voter: that no device directly learns the voter’s choices. This seems unavoidable
for such expressive ballots if the system is to be usable.
She inserts the ballot into the EBM and selects her preferred language and can run
through a training module on the machine to learn about the whole voting procedure,
verification and tallying. The voter is now offered the choice of sequence in which she
votes that is, the Legislative Assembly (LA) or Legislative Council ballots, and for the
latter she can vote either “above the line” (ATL) or “below the line” (BTL). Note that
although the voter can vote at any polling station, the LA ballot is specific to the region
in which she is registered. She must however, fill in both a LA and LC ballot and will
be prompted by the EBM to ensure that she does this.1
1Exact rules on ballot spoiling are a matter of user interface: at present, voters are allowed to cast
incomplete or invalid preference lists, as long as they are warned. The receipts then reveal their
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For each ballot (LA or LC), the EBM scans the the QR code which represents the
permutation of the candidate ordering on her ballot and displays the candidates in legal
ballot order. Once the voter enters her choices, she is asked to confirm her choices and
when she does so, the EBM prints on a separate sheet of paper:
1. the district,
2. the SerialNumber,
3. the voter preferences permuted appropriately to match the Prêt à Voter ballot,
4. a QR code with this data, plus private WBB signature.
This is the voter’s receipt. Note that the EBM knows the permutation on the ballot
and so re-orders the voter’s selection accordingly. Note also that the EBM can assist the
voter by pointing out syntactic errors, for example, duplicate rankings etc.
Before printing, the EBM submits to the Private WBB exactly the data it will print
on the receipt. Then at printing time it adds the Private WBB signature, as a further
QR code, onto the receipt.
Check 2: EBM vote printing. The voter should check that the printed receipt
matches her intended vote. This includes checking that the serial numbers match, and
that the printed preferences match her intended vote arranged according to the candidate
order on her ballot.
It is essential for integrity that all voters are encouraged to check that
their printed vote matches their intention.
The voter now folds her candidate list to keep it secret, and leaves the booth with
both pieces of paper. There should be a public space inside the polling place that allows
officials to enforce the following procedures without exposing voters to coercion.
Existing laws preventing voters from photographing their ordinary paper ballots should
also apply to the candidate list, for the same reason: a voter who retains evidence of the
order the candidates are listed on her ballot can prove later how she voted.
Check 3: Private WBB Signature on vote. The voter can check the signature
using a purpose-built smart phone app. This must of course incorporate a check that the
data signed by the WBB is the same as the data printed on the paper.
It is essential for non-repudiation that the voter checks the signature on
her receipt before leaving the polling place.
If she fails to check, and does not receive a properly-signed receipt, then she will be able
to detect later, but not to prove, that her properly-submitted vote has been excluded
from the WBB.
decision to spoil their ballot. An alternative, but not currently implemented, method, would be to
include a candidate called “spoiled ballot” who would be the first preference of any invalid ballot.
Subsequent preferences would be meaningless, but could be filled in to make the receipt look like
that of a valid vote. This would hide whether the voter had voted formally or not.
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This is the voter’s last opportunity to cancel her vote, for example if Check 2 or Check 3
have failed, or no receipt has been issued. Procedures for vote cancellation are described
in Sec 3.1.4.
Next, the voter shreds the candidate list. This prevents her from proving how she
voted.
It is essential for privacy and integrity that all voters are required to
shred their candidate list before leaving the polling place.
The voter should be easily able to produce multiple copies of her receipt, for example
using a photocopier or a camera (on a smartphone). This combats the “trash attack,”
[BL11] and also allows others to check her receipt on the WBB. It would also be quite
reasonable for the VEC to retain duplicate copies of receipts, as well as letting the voters
take them home. Of course there would have to be a careful procedure for ensuring that
the centrally retained reciepts were accurate copies of the voters’.
Check 4: Receipt appears on WBB. After a given time period, the voter can use
her receipt to check that the information is correctly recorded on the WBB.
These 4 checks provide evidence that the vote is cast as the voter intended, and included
unaltered in the count.
We now describe the ballot confirmation process in more detail.
Check 5: Checking the mixing and decryption proofs on the WBB. Anyone
can verify the single, public, proof that all votes are correctly mixed and decrypted.
These 5 checks provide evidence that the vote is cast as the voter intended, and included
unaltered in the count. We now describe the ballot confirmation process in more detail.
3.1.3. Confirming ballot correctness
Check 1a: confirming ballot printing To perform Check 1, confirming ballot cor-
rectness, the ballot can be taken back to the printer. The printer prints a proof of correct
ballot formation, along with a WBB signature. The WBB must record that the ballot
has been confirmed, and therefore not accept any vote cast with that ballot form. As
part of the confirmation process, a clear “CHECKED—NOT TO BE USED TO VOTE”
message (which must be visible) is printed on the ballot form.
The voter can also check the proof of decryption later on any other machine, including
at home, so we are not trusting the polling-place machines for confirmation of ballot
construction.
When the day’s WBB becomes available (see Section 4.1), it shows which serial num-
bers were confirmed and displays a proof of what the candidate ordering should be. (It
also shows which ones were voted and what the preferences were.)
Ensuring the mutual exclusion of confirmed and cast ballots is vitally important. The
Private WBB must run a realtime check that the same ballot is not both confirmed and
voted. This process is trusted for privacy, but not for integrity because violations are
detectable.
Check 1b: Verifying the WBB signature on the printed ballot. Each ballot is
printed with a WBB signature that includes its Serial Number and district, to indicate
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it is legitimate and has been registered for the correct district. Voters should check this
as part of ballot confirmation. (This prevents a corrupt printer from printing candidates
for one district onto a ballot paper that is actually registered for a different, presumably
more marginal, district.)
Check 1b could be performed on any ballot, including those that will be used for voting
on. However, it is difficult to allow this while also enforcing procedures for preventing
voters from recording their candidate list. In the absence of such procedures, Check 1b
is only part of the ballot confirmation procedure.
In Section 5 we describe what to do when some of these checks fail.
3.1.4. Ballot cancellation: individual quarantine
There may be legitimate circumstances when a voter finds a check is not successful and
wishes to instruct that the vote should not be cast. This may be used for various failures,
including
• when a voter claims the printed vote differs from their intention
• when a printed vote does not include a valid WBB signature
• when the EBM fails to produce a printout
• when an attempted ballot generation or ballot printing confirmation check fails,
either because it times out or because it does not produce a valid proof of correctness
or a valid signature.
The terminology used by VEC for this process was Individual Quarantine (IQ).
A cancellation request overrides any other request, such as confirming or voting. When
a vote is cancelled, the cancellation is recorded against the Serial number on the (private
and public) WBB. The voter must give up their candidate list in order to request a
cancellation.
A cancellation request is allowed only if the voter presents the candidate
list, and never after the voter has left the polling place.
It is important to emphasise that a vote is never cancelled except according to the
following procedure. The process is:
1. The voter requests a cancellation and provides the candidate list. If the candidate
list is already shredded or missing, then cancellation is refused.
2. Polling official scans the Serial Number on the ballot and requests a cancellation.
3. VEC HQ provides permission for the cancellation to occur. This authorisation of
cancellation is uploaded to the WBB, which replies to the printer with a receipt.
Printer prints a signed cancellation onto the ballot.
4. Voter checks signature on cancellation.
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5. Polling officials make a paper log of the cancellation, which is signed by the voter
and retained by the electoral commission.2
The intention and expectation is that this process is used rarely, and with the explicit
observation by at least two (and preferably more) officials at the polling place. Cancella-
tion requests should be independently recorded on paper at the polling place, and should
require approval from senior officials. If the voter does not have a ballot receipt, for
example because the EBM failed to produce a printout, then this will also be recorded.
3.1.5. Procedures for defeating chain voting
Chain voting, which applies to conventional voting too, is an attack in which a coercer
smuggles a (partially) completed ballot out of a polling place, and then gives it to a voter
with instructions to cast it and bring an unmarked ballot back out. The coercer then
fills in this ballot and uses it to repeat the chain voting attack with a new voter.
In Prêt à Voter, the chain voting risk applies to a coercer who obtains a printed ballot
form, records the candidate order, and then sends a voter into back into the polling place
with instructions to vote in a particular way and return with both a receipt and a new,
unmarked, ballot form. Since the coercer has already recorded the voter’s candidate
order, the receipt shows how the person voted. The new ballot form is used to repeat
the attack with a new voter.
vVote includes some technical measures to defend against chain voting. Printed ballot
forms expire after 5 minutes if they have not been used to start a session, and the private
WBB refuses to allow the same ballot form to be used to start another voting session
once it has been used to start one. This means someone who sneaks an unused printed
ballot form out of the polling place has 5 minutes to send it in with another voter. If
someone sneaks one out having used it to start a session (and the tablet sits there with
session active), then attempting to sneak this back in will not work as the printed ballot
cannot be used to start a fresh session and the abandoned session itself “locks.”.
3.2. Vision impaired voters
We assume that the vision-impaired voter has registered at a polling place and had her
name marked off. The printing station should work fine for vision impaired voters, though
there may need to be special procedures to help them collect their ballot privately. If
they need assistance, it is important that the assistant does not see the printed candidate
list.
The vision impaired voter takes the slip to an Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM). At the
EBM, she inserts the slip. The system is set so that she has an audio-only session in her
2We would like to be able to guarantee that people cannot walk out of the polling place with validly
signed receipts that have nevertheless been cancelled; unfortunately, this cannot be enforced—voters
can always pocket their valid receipt and claim they never got one. We need to be careful that
they cannot cancel it and then use their preference printout to claim that their vote was incorrectly
cancelled. The insistence that they sign a paper log of their cancellation request is designed to defeat
this attack.
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preferred language and the touch screen is laid out like a keypad, following the TVS2
standard. For example, the four corners when touched render 1, 3, ∗ and #, the middle
top and bottom give 2 and 0, and so on.3
The session is similar to the one described previously in Section 3.1.2 in that the voter
has to fill in ballots for her LA and LC (ATL/BTL) votes, but this time she indicates her
choices by touching the appropriate parts of the screen and has voice prompts to guide
her. When she has filled in all required parts of the slip, she is given a voice confirmation
of her vote choices and if she agrees with them, she can finish the voting part of the
ceremony by touching the designated part of the screen.
As before, the EBM prints her reciept, including the SerialNumber, division, prefer-
ences, and Private WBB signature.
This voter is unable to perform by sight the crucial check that the printed values match
her intended vote. Hence she may take both her candidate list and printed preferences
to another EBM, which scans the QR code and the printed preferences, and reads her
vote back to her. This service is called “The Readback App.” It can also read back just
a preferences list or just a candidate list.
It is essential for integrity that vision-impaired voters are encouraged
to check their printed preferences using an independent machine.
If a compromised EBM can predict that a particular voter will not check their preferences,
the vote can be manipulated. This cast-as-intended verification mechanism is requires
trusting that the voter can find at least one EBM in the polling place that does not
collude with the first one she used.
An alternative design would be to allow voters to bring their own devices in to perform
this check, but this would violate vote privacy because the device might record the data,
hence telling someone else how the person voted.
By this point we can be confident that the printed preferences match the voter’s
intentions. She must now destroy the candidate list.
It is essential for privacy that all voters are required to shred their
candidate list before leaving the polling place.
As already mentioned, the EBMs can also speak the preference orders on the slip so the
voter can note them down (with a blind note-taker device or with memory). This helps
the voter to check the EBM unassisted but does not really affect privacy or verifiability
because she must still check that her vote is printed as she requested, and recorded on
the WBB as it is printed, rather than trusting the EBM to tell her the truth. She could
do the WBB check with assistance from a print reader or from a sighted person without
jeopardising privacy.
3See http://www.eca.gov.au/research/files/telephone-voting-standard-reviewed.pdf
We have also made a new kind of interface, similar to (but invented before) this:
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/03/26/
apple-patents-no-look-multitouch-user-interface-for-portable-devices
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Note that the only steps that need to be private are the ballot marking by the EBM
and check with a second EBM. All the other verification steps: confirmation of the
ballot, confirmation of the receipt signature and of correct posting of the receipt to the
public WBB, are exactly the same as those for typical voters, and can be performed with
assistance without jeopardising ballot privacy.
Confirmation
If she has performed a confirmation check on a ballot, the voter can still go home and
use her screen- or print-reader, with the same confirmation-checking software as everyone
else, to make sure her candidate list matches the encrypted list on the WBB. The only
important detail is that she has to make sure she knows what the cleartext candidate
order is. She must either ask several people or use (a) print reader(s). Neither of these
impacts upon privacy: there are no privacy implications for anyone in confirming ballots.
3.3. Observing that the vVote output matches what is input
into the count
VEC procedures require vVote ballots to be printed out before being incorporated into
either the manual tally of paper votes (for LA ballots) or the manual data entry of paper
votes into the electronic STV count (for LC ballots). The scrutineers who observe the
manual tally must reconcile these ballots with those output from vVote on the public
WBB.
The printouts will be visually distinct from ordinary paper ballots. All the vVote votes
will bear a unique number on their footer which aligns with a verifiable output vote on the
WBB so that they can be checked independently later. Note that these unique numbers
are added to the votes after they have been shuffled and hence disassociated from the
voter who cast them.
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4. System Component details
4.1. The Web Bulletin Board
A number of voting schemes require some form of append-only Web Bulletin Board
(WBB). However, specific details of how to design or implement such a service are often
lacking. In this section we do not aim to propose a generic WBB, only to define one
that will work within the constraints we have and offer the properties we need. The
fundamental requirements we have of a WBB are
• that every observer gets the same information, and
• that the data written to it cannot be changed or deleted without detection.
In prior work on the Prêt à Voter protocol, a great deal has been expected of the WBB.
It has been expected to prove that it satisfies the properties above, while also responding
in real time with signatures and confirmation check information. The design presented
here separates those two sorts of roles, breaking the WBB into two:
The Public WBB This is a static digest of the day’s transcript. It is updated very
infrequently (e.g. once per day). A hash is broadcast via some other channel
(e.g. a newspaper or radio broadcast) so everyone can be confident they all get
the same information. This data could be replicated extensively because no secret
information is held. This is what voters consult for evidence that their votes were
included in the tally, and evidence that the tally was correct. The main property
is: A corrupt WBB cannot falsify its data undetectably except by violating some
computational assumption.
The Private WBB A robust secure database which receives messages, performs
basic validity checks, and returns a signature. Its correctness based on threshold
assumptions. This is implemented as a collection of peers who share a signing key.
Validly signed messages are guaranteed, under threshold assumptions, to appear
subsequently on the Public WBB. A malicious threshold can collude to misrecord
and expose votes. Such misbehaviour is detectable in principle by observing the
public WBB, but may not necessarily be provable.
The result of this split should be that the Private WBB can follow a protocol for
distributed secure databases without needing to worry about reliable broadcast to the
public. The real broadcast channel with memory is a static data structure, the WBB,
which is much easier to design. In practice the WBB could be replicated in the cloud.
The Private WBB would receive communication only from other “inside” entities such as
print servers and EBMs.
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4.1.1. Public Web Bulletin Board (Public WBB)
The Public WBB is an authenticated public broadcast channel with memory. We assume
some genuine public broadcast channel that can be used to send a small amount of
information, specifically a signed cryptographic hash of the transcript. When someone
checks the public WBB for inclusion of their data, they also re-hash the contents and
check the result against the publicly broadcast one.
The public WBB consists of static data broken into separate commits, with the signed
hash of the prior commit step being included in each commit along with the other election
data.
Verifying that something appears on the public WBB is a two step process:
• Firstly the observer requests an index file that lists all ballot serial numbers (or
whatever other data is being requested) and which commit they are in. The client
side code allows the voter to look up the serial number and then download the
relevant commit.
• The second step is downloading all the data for the relevant commit, checking that
a particular data item (e.g. a particular voting receipt) is present, and checking
that the recomputed hash matches the signed, published one.
If the total amount of data per commit becomes large in future, the process of proving
inclusion could be made more efficient using hash trees or other log-size data structures
[GTT11].
4.1.2. Private Web Bulletin Board (Private WBB)
A private WBB is a robust distributed database which:
• accepts items to be posted (if they do not clash with previous posts),
• issues receipts (which are signed accepted items), and
• periodically publishes what it has received on the public WBB.
The data published on the public WBB for any particular period must include all items
that had receipts issued during that period. Robustness is achieved through the use of
several peered servers which cooperate on accepting items, issuing receipts, and publish-
ing the bulletin board. They make use of a threshold signature scheme which allows a
subset of the peers at or above a particular threshold to jointly generate signatures on
data. The peers collectively provide the bulletin board service as long as a threshold of
them are honest, and as long as a threshold of them are involved in handling any item
posted to the bulletin board. Thus the implementation is correct in the presence of com-
munication failures, unavailability or failure of peers, and also dishonesty of peers. The
threshold t required to achieve this must be greater than two-thirds of the total number
n of peers: t > 2n/3. There is no single point of failure: the system can tolerate failure or
non-participation of any component, as long as a threshold of peers remain operational at
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any stage. It also allows for different threshold sets of peers to be operational at different
times. For example, a peer may be rebooted during the protocol, thereby missing some
item posts, and may then resume participation. Details of the protocol are given in a
separate publication [CS14].
In addition to robustness and non-repudiation, the private WBB must also perform
some basic validity checking on submitted items. In particular, it must reject items that
“clash” with previously accepted submissions: a new request to run a confirmation check
or vote on a ballot of a given serial number must be rejected if that serial number has
already been voted on.
The key properties required of the Private WBB are:
(bb.1) only items that have been posted to the bulletin board may appear on it;
(bb.2) any item that has a signed receipt issued must appear on the published bulletin
board (i.e. public WBB);
(bb.3) two clashing items must not both appear on the bulletin board;
(bb.4) items cannot be removed from the bulletin board once they are published.
It follows from bb.2 and bb.3 that if two items clash then receipts must not be issued for
both of them.
The bulletin board provides a protocol for the posting of an item by an EBM, and
its acknowledgement with a receipt. It also provides another two related protocols for
the publishing of the bulleting board: an optimistic one, and a fallback. These protocols
are given in [CS14] together with their proofs of correctness with respect to the key
properties.
4.2. Print-on-demand printers and Randomness Generation
Service
The processes for printing and confirming correctness of ballot forms are vital components
of Prêt à Voter. This project necessitated a completely new scheme, which is described
below.
4.2.1. Protocol overview
Our protocol has two roles. The “randomness generation servers,” of which a threshold
of at least one are trusted for privacy, send randomness to a “printer”. The “printer” uses
only that randomness to generate the ballots, which it can then print on demand. In
brief:
Before the voting period:
1. Each randomness generation server generates some randomness, commits to it pub-
licly, and sends the opening secretly to the printer.
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2. The printer uses the combined randomness to generate the encrypted ballot, which
it publishes.
During the voting period:
3. When required, the printer prints the next ballot in sequence, with human-readable
candidate names.
There are thus two important points for public confirmation checking:
1. A confirmation check of the encrypted ballot produced in step 2, to check that the
candidate ciphertexts are valid and that the printer used the proper randomness.
This is described in Section 4.2.2.
2. A standard Prêt à Voter confirmation check of the printed ballot from step 3,
to check that the printed human-readable candidate names match those of the
encrypted ballot. This is described for our scheme in Section 4.2.3.
Throughout this document when we refer to the “Printer” we are in fact referring to the
tablet device that is connected to the printer. As such, the “Printer” has the processing
power you would expect to find on a mid-range tablet.
4.2.2. Ballot Generation
The main idea is that the printer generates a permuted list of candidate ciphers using
randomness values generated by a distributed set of peers. As such the printer undertakes
the expensive crypto operations, but does not have any influence over the values used
in those operations. This prevents the printer from mounting kleptographic attacks or
otherwise having any influence over the ciphertexts.
During ballot generation the printer is checked to ensure that it has performed honestly:
if a sufficient number of ballots are confirmed and shown to be correct then we can gain
a high assurance that the printer has behaved honestly. The definition of “honest” is
different from standard versions of Prêt à Voter, in which a dishonest printer can only
misalign the printed candidate names with the ballot ciphertexts. In our version, a
dishonest printer may also attempt to generate invalid ballot ciphertexts or perform
a kleptographic attack by using randomness other than that specified by the protocol.
However, these two kinds of cheating can be detected by a ballot-generation confirmation
check—see below.
Notation:
Enck(m; r) is the encryption of message m with public key k and randomness r.1
Deck(m) is a decryption of m using the private key k.
ReEnc(θ; r) is a re-encryption (re-randomisation) of the ciphertext θ using the random-
ness r (this abstracts the requirement of knowing the public key, which is a require-
ment for ElGamal re-encryption).
1The Victorian project uses Elliptic Curve El Gamal.
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c(m) is a perfectly hiding commitment to message m (using some randomness not ex-
plicitly given).
c(m; r) is a perfectly hiding commitment to message m (using randomness r).2
PKE is the election public key (which is thresholded).
PKP is the printer’s public key (which is not thresholded/distributed).
SKP is the printer’s private key.
n is the number of candidates.
b is the number of ballots to be generated for each printer.
G is the number of randomness generation servers.
RGeni is the i-th randomness generation server.
SymmEncsk(m) is a symmetric-key encryption of m under the symmetric key sk.
h(m) is a cryptographic hash of the message m.3
SymmDecsk(m) is a symmetric-key decryption of m using key sk.
RTi is RGeni’s private table of encrypted random values (Fig 4.5).
CRT i is RGeni’s public table of commitments to the values in RT i (Fig 4.6).
We will post on the public WBB values that are encrypted with a threshold key, or
perfectly hiding commitments. We will not post values that are encrypted with a non-
thresholded key. We could have used computationally hiding commitments or encryptions
with non-thresholded keys, but either of these would have meant that a single leak of
relevant parameters, even quite a long time in the future, could have been combined with
WBB data to violate ballot privacy. Our system does not achieve everlasting privacy,
but it achieves a somewhat related weaker property, that no single entity’s data (apart
from the printer’s) is enough to break ballot privacy, even given WBB data.
Pre-Ballot Generation
Before the ballot generation starts the following must occur:
2In the vVote project we use the hash-based commitment scheme described in [JJR02].
3We use 256-bit AES and SHA-256 respectively. This means that the computational difficulty of
guessing a key (2256) is much greater than that of finding a collision (2128). However, this seems
justifiable since collision-finding is only useful for cheating during ballot generation, which must be
performed in a restricted time, while guessing the symmetric key can be used to break ballot privacy
long after the election.
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Candidate Name ID
Vladimir Putin cand1
Mohamed Morsi cand2
... ...
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad candn
Figure 4.1.: Initial Ballot Input: Candidate Identifiers
PrinterA:1 . . . PrinterB:1 . . . PrinterC:1
PrinterA:2 . . . PrinterB:2 . . . PrinterC:2
...
...
...
...
...
PrinterA:b
Figure 4.2.: Initial Ballot input: Serial numbers for printers A,B,C.
1. The election public key sharers jointly run a distributed key generation protocol to
generate a thresholded private key and joint public key PKE .4
2. A list of candidate identifiers is generated and posted on the public WBB, as shown
in Figure 4.1. Candidate identifiers are arbitrary, distinct elements of the message
space of the encryption function.5
3. For each printer, a list of serial numbers of the form “PrinterID:index” is determ-
inistically generated and posted on the public WBB. This serial number is just the
literal string as given. These serve as row indices for later computation.
4. Each printer constructs a key pair and publishes the public key PKP .
All this data, which is posted on the WBB immediately before ballot generation, is
shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The protocol for postsing a file to the WBB is shown in
Figure 4.3.
The following sections describe the process of ballot generation for a single printer, but
it should be clear how the same process will be run in parallel for each printer.
Randomness Generation
The randomness generation consists of each server RGeni generating a large table of
secret random values and sending them (privately) to the printer after posting (public)
commitments to them on the WBB. The protocol for posting the public commitments is
illustrated in Figure 4.4.
4We keep the key sharers and the randomness generation servers conceptually separate, even if we end
up using the same servers.
5For vVote, candidate identifiers are elliptic curve points either randomly selected or calculated as part
of the optimisation used to speed up mixing, depending on the type of race.
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PODPrinter Private WBB
boothID,boothSig,“file”,digest,fileSize,submissionID,desc
submissionSig,submissionID,“file”,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
msc File Message Sequence Chart
• boothSig : SignPODPrinter{serialNo,digest}
• peerSig : SignWBB{submissionID,digest,senderID,commitTime}
Figure 4.3.: File Message Sequence Chart
Detailed algorithm In detail: each random value has length k, where k is a security
parameter which should be about 256 bits. Each server RGeni generates a random
symmetric key ski. It then generates a table of b ∗n pairs of pieces of random data, each
of size 2 ∗ k bits and encrypted under ski. The table is denoted by RT i, and each pair
can be retrieved by the serial number and column, or the row and column.6 The result
is shown in Figure 4.5. The idea is that the first element of each pair, r(row,col), will be
used later by the printer; the second element, R(row,col), is used to commit to r(row,col)
and to open the commitment in case of confirmations.
Each server commits to r(row,col) by posting on the WBB a commitment to it using
randomness R(row,col). The table of commitments is shown in Figure 4.6. Call the table
CRT i. Each peer RGeni posts its CRT i, and checks all CRT i’s are posted before sending
RT i privately to the printer.7 RGeni also encrypts ski with the printer’s public key and
sends the result (denoted eski = EncPKP (ski; r)) to the printer.
6For example RGeni.RT i(PrinterA : 1, 2) and RGeni.RT i(1, 2) will return the pair of encrypted ran-
dom values in the second column for the first ballot: SymmEncski(r1,2||R1,2).
7This is to stop the last peer choosing their randomness when they know the others’. If this was not
enforced, then one bad randomness generation server colluding with a printer could determine the
randomness values for each of that printer’s ballots, thus breaking privacy. The bad server would
wait until the printer told it all the other servers’ random values, then generate its own to produce
a particular final value.
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PODPrinter Private WBB
boothID,boothSig,“mixrandomcommit”,digest,fileSize,submissionID,printerID
submissionID,“mixrandomcommit”,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
msc Mix Random Commit
• boothSig : SignPODPrinter{submissionID,printerID,digest}
• peerSig : SignWBB{submissionID,senderID,printerID,digest,commitTime}
Figure 4.4.: Mix Random Commit Message Sequence Chart
Ballot Permutation and Commitment
The printer receives the respective RT i and corresponding (encrypted) key eski from
each server. The printer also downloads or constructs the candidate identifiers and serial
numbers shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The printer now needs to encrypt and permute
the candidate identifiers.
For each candidate identifier candk in the pre-committed table in Figure 4.1 it encrypts
it using the combined randomness from the RT tables, received from the randomness
generation servers. To combine the randomness the printer first decrypts the encrypted
symmetric key eski received from each server and then uses the resulting key ski to
decrypt the randomness in RT i. For each element of each RT , the printer checks that
the decrypted pair rrow,col, Rrow,col opens the commitment at CRT row,col. It challenges
any that do not—see below for what it should do when it detects RGeni cheating at this
point.
The decrypted first elements rrow,col from each peer are concatenated and hashed.
The printer then uses the hash output for randomness when encrypting the candidate
identifier under PKE . The resulting ciphers are then sorted into canonical order to
produce a random permutation. These ciphers are posted on the public WBB. Note that
the output of the encryption is pseudo-random and as such sorting the encrypted ciphers
will give a pseudo-random permutation pi. The printer retains this permutation so that
it can print the plaintexts in the appropriate order when requested to print that ballot.
After the ciphers are submitted to the WBB, the confirmation checking protocol detailed
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SerialNumber Encrypted Randomness
PrinterA:1 SymmEncski(r1,1||R1,1) . . . SymmEncski(r1,n||R1,n)
PrinterA:2 SymmEncski(r2,1||R2,1) . . . SymmEncski(r2,n||R2,n)
...
...
...
...
PrinterA:b SymmEncski(rb,1||Rb,1) . . . SymmEncski(rb,n||Rb,n)
Figure 4.5.: Ballot Input: Table RT i, sent privately from peer i to printer A without
public posting.
SerialNumber Committed Randomness
PrinterA:1 c(r1,1;R1,1) . . . c(r1,n;R1,n)
PrinterA:2 c(r2,1;R2,1) . . . c(r2,n;R2,n)
...
...
...
...
PrinterA:b c(rb,1;Rb,1) . . . c(rb,n;Rb,n)
Figure 4.6.: Commitment to Initial Ballot Input: Table CRT i, posted by peer i on the
WBB.
in Section 4.2.2 can be run. The Ballot Generation Commitment protocol between the
printer and the bulletin board is given in Figure 4.7.
Algorithm 1: Deterministic Encryption by Printer
for i = 1→ G do . Decrypt the symmetric keys from the RGenServers
ski ← DecSKP (eski)
end for
for j = 1→ b do . b is the number of ballots.
for k = 1→ n do . n is the number of candidates.
rand← SHA(SymmDecsk1(RT 1(j, k))‖ . . . ‖SymmDecskG(RTG(j, k)))
CTj,k ← EncPKE (candk; rand)
end for
CT(j) ← Sort(CT(j)) . CT(j) returns the entire row
permsj ← pi . pi is the permutation applied to sort CTj .
end for
Send CT to WBB.
The algorithm run by the printer is given in Algorithm 1. The intention is that only the
printer knows which ciphertexts correspond to which candidates, but its algorithm for
generating those ciphertexts is deterministic. Hence it cannot use the ciphertexts to leak
information without detection. Of course, the printer could always leak that information
via a side channel, but this is unavoidable and occurs with any form of electronic ballot
printing or marking.
What the printer should do if RGeni cheats It is important in the above protocol that
the printer checks the opening of each commitment, i.e. checks that for each element of
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PODPrinter Private WBB
boothID,boothSig,“ballotgencommit”,digest,fileSize,submissionID
submissionID,“ballotgencommit”,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
msc Ballot Generation Commit
• boothSig : SignPODPrinter{submissionID,digest}
• peerSig : SignWBB{submissionID,digest,senderID,commitTime}
Figure 4.7.: Ballot Generation Commit Message Sequence Chart
each RT , the decrypted pair rrow,col, Rrow,col opens the commitment at CRT row,col. It is
important in practice that the printer raise an alarm on any commitments that are not
correctly opened. Exactly how such a dispute should be resolved requires some careful
engineering of procedures. It is difficult to tell whether the printer or the randomness
generation server is misbehaving without exposing private ballot data. This is not neces-
sarily a problem, because the randomness contributed by other randomness generation
servers would not be exposed. Hence the other ballots remain private.
Note that the issue does not affect public verifiability, because the absence of proper
commitment opening would be detected by a confirmation check of this ballot. It does,
however, affect accountability: if a confirmation check detects that the value used to
encrypt a ballot was not a valid opening of the commitment on the WBB, we would like
to know whether it was the randomness generation server or the printer that cheated.
If we insist that the printer performs this check, then we can be certain that a failed
confirmation is the printer’s fault.
Alternative construction with PRNGs Rather than generate a separate random value
for each candidate in each ballot, an alternative is to generate one random value for each
ballot, then use a cryptographic Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) to expand
it to produce randomness for all of the encrypted values in the ballot. This introduces
an assumption on the good expanding behaviour of the PRNG, but substantially reduces
the communication costs of the protocol. Hence the tables of Figures 4.5 and 4.6 would
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need only 2 columns rather than n + 1. It does not significantly change confirmation
checking.
However, we have not taken this approach for the Victorian system due to practical
concerns about PRNG implementations. The most important is the possibility that
variations in implementations could imply a failure of reproducibility of the random
sequences, which is required for confirmation checking. In principle this should not be a
difficult issue to address. In practice we were concerned this would make it significantly
harder to write an independent verifier, so we opted to omit the PRNGs.
Ballot Generation Audit
A suitable percentage of ballots are chosen at random for audit.8 For each ballot selec-
ted, the printer posts on the WBB the randomness it used during the generation, i.e. to
open the commitments for that SerialNumber in each peer’s CRT table. The protocol
is shown in Figure 4.8. The printer can either have this stored, or else can recalculate it
from the encryptions it received prior to ballot generation. Anyone can verify the com-
mitment openings (rrow,col, Rrow,col) and reconstruct the ballot ciphertexts from them.
Thus anyone can check that the ballots were correctly constructed and that the printer
used the appropriate randomness.
PODPrinter Private WBB
boothID,boothSig,“ballotauditcommit”,digest,fileSize,submissionID
submissionID,“ballotauditcommit”,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
msc Ballot Audit Commit
• boothSig : SignPODPrinter{submissionID,digest}
• peerSig : SignWBB{submissionID,digest,senderID,commitTime}
Figure 4.8.: Ballot Audit Commit Message Sequence Chart
8The questions of who chooses, how they choose, and how it can be guaranteed that they choose well
enough to engender confidence in a particular election result are discussed in Section 6.1.2.
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4.2.3. Print on Demand
This section describes what happens when a voter appears at a polling place. The printer
needs to print a pre-generated ballot for the appropriate district. The printer knows the
plaintexts and permutation for a particular ballot so can easily print the appropriate
ballot out.
However, there is a risk that a misbehaving printer might print a completely invalid bal-
lot, i.e. one that has not been part of the generation process described above. Although
this is detectable by confirmation checks, we prefer for practical reasons to prevent it
altogether. Hence we require that the printer obtain a signature from the WBB in order
to create an authentic ballot. The WBB is attesting to those ciphertexts matching what
the printer has already committed to.
The vVote project uses a combined EBM and scanner rather than the traditional Prêt
à Voter technique of filling in the ballot with a pencil and then scanning it. The print on
demand protocol works exactly the same either way, but the description below assumes
the vVote-style combined scanner and EBM.
Voter Poll Worker POD Printer Private WBB
ID
district
boothID, boothSig, serialNo, “pod”, district, ballotReductions
serialNo, “pod”, peerID, peerSig, commitTime
peerSig, ballot
msc Print On Demand
• boothSig : SignPODTablet{serialNo,district}
• peerSig : SignWBB{serialNo,district} (the returned peerSig forms the serialSig in
future sequence charts)
Figure 4.9.: Print on Demand Message Sequence Chart
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Figure 4.9 shows the message sequence chart for print on demand, which is elucidated
in Section 4.2.3 below. The authorisation, ballot reduction and serial number signing all
take place together in a single round of communication. The signatures generated are
deterministic BLS signatures [BLS01], including the signature from the WBB.
Ballot Reduction
It is unpredictable exactly how many of each ballot will be required at each location. We
could have generated an abundant oversupply of ballots with exactly the right number
of candidates for each division, but this would have been quite expensive. Instead, for
efficiency, we generate an abundant oversupply of generic ballots with a larger than
necessary number of candidates, then reduce it down to the appropriately sized ballot
for the district/region it is going to be used in. This allows great flexibility about who
votes at what polling place—any voter can arrive anywhere and have a ballot produced
to match their voting eligibility.
If the ballot contains more ciphers than candidates, we need to reduce the ballot in a
manner that can be verified. The following proposal has the nice feature that the voter
(or the EBM if there is one) does not need to know where the blanks are in order to cast
the vote: they just get a permuted list of the candidates they were expecting. Then the
EBM prints, and the voter checks, the voter’s preference numbers against that order.
Suppose from now on there are m candidates in the division and n (> m) ciphertexts
on the ballot. (n = m is a special case of the steps below.) The printer is supposed to
use the ciphertexts for cand1, cand2, . . . , candm. Of course it could cheat and attempt to
use other ciphertexts instead, but this could be detected at confirmation checking like
any other kind of bad printing. We want to be able to demonstrate afterwards on the
WBB that it used the right ciphertexts. The protocol is as follows:
Pollworker: authenticates the voters (using whatever secure or insecure method is tra-
ditional) and sends a print request to the Print On Demand device specifying the
district/region they can vote in,9
Printer: retrieves the next available ballot and looks up the number m of candidates in
the submitted district/region.
Printer: sends to the WBB:
• the SerialNumber,
• the division, and
• a listBallotReductionRandomness of randomness values for the unused cipher-
texts (i.e. the ones from candm+1 to candn), together with their respective
permuted locations so the WBB can check them. The randomness values are
those computed by the printer in the algorithm in section 4.2.2)
9More generally, it is the pollworkers’ responsibility to authenticate the voter and request the ballot(s)
that the person is eligible to vote on.
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WBB: checks that the ciphers held for candm+1 to candn are encryptions of the candidate
IDs of the unused candidates for the specified division.
• if valid it signs the serial number and the division and returns it to the printer,
and posts the randomness values to the WBB so they can be publicly checked;
• if invalid it returns an error message.
Printer: Checks the WBB signature of the serial number and division and, if valid, prints
the ballot and signature. The printer knows the permutation and plaintexts so does
not need to do any crypto to print the ballot
Voter: votes on the ballot exactly as if it had been generated for the right number of
candidates,
EBM: submits the ballot to the WBB exactly as if it had been generated for the right
number of candidates,
WBB: accepts (and signs) the ballot only if it is accompanied by a signed serial number
and division
EBM: prints the sig on the receipt,
Voter: (optionally) checks the sig, which covers only data visible to the voter.
Voter: shreds the candidate list,
Voter: later checks their vote on the WBB. They only need to check the serial number
and order of their preference numbers—the correct opening of the unused (too big)
candidate numbers will be universally verifiable.
Print confirmation
Suppose a voter wants to confirm a printed ballot, i.e. to check that the printed candidate
list matches the ciphertexts on the WBB. The following is performed:
Voter: requests a confirmation check from the same printer that printed their ballot,
Printer: sends to the WBB the randomness to open the commitments to the randomness
on each CRT i used to generate the ballot in the ballot generation phase
WBB: checks the serial number has not already been voted on or confirmed and if not,
opens the commitments, reconstructs the ballot, computes the permutation pi, posts
all the data on the public WBB, and sends a jointly signed copy of pi (or candidate
names in permuted order) to the printer
Printer: The printer prints the signature
Voter: checks the signed order of candidates pi against the order printed on the ballot
(note, the permutation signed by the WBB should reflect any successful ballot
reduction already performed).
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Voter: takes their confirmed ballot home and checks that the value provided on the
WBB matches the candidate order that was signed.
Voter POD Printer Private WBB
serialNo, district, serialSig, permutation
boothID, boothSig, serialNo, serialSig, permutation, commitWitness, “audit”, district
serialNo, “audit”, peerID, peerSig, commitTime
serialNo, district, serialSig, permutation, peerID, peerSig, commitTime
msc Confirmation Check
• boothSig : SignPODTablet{serialNo,“audit”,permutation,commitWitness}
• serialSig : SignWBB{serialNo,district}
• peerSig : SignWBB{“audit”,serialNo,reducedPermutation,commitTime}
Figure 4.10.: Print on Demand Confirmation Check Message Sequence Chart
Figure 4.10 shows the message sequence chart for confirming.
Forward Secrecy
The randomness held on a printer is sufficient to reconstruct the ballots, and hence reveal
the candidate orderings. If a printer is stolen, the randomness it holds will expose the
associated ballot forms. Hence it is desirable for a printer to delete the randomness for
ballots on which votes have been cast, since there is a potential privacy breach.
However, when a printer prints a ballot it must allow for a print confirmation check
which will require it to open the commitment to the randomness. Therefore, after a
printer has printed a ballot, it must retain this randomness for some period of time.
After the ballot has been used to cast a vote, a confirmation check is not allowed
and so the randomness no longer needs to be retained and can be deleted. Deletion
can be triggered by a confirmation message to the printer, signed by the WBB, when a
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vote is cast. Alternatively a time limit can be set on a confirmation request following
ballot printing, and the randomness can be deleted after that time if no request has been
received.
Note that the encrypted randomness values and symmetric key are sent directly to the
printer and not posted on the WBB. As such, there is no publicly available information
that could be combined with a stolen, but previously honest, printer to reveal used
ballots. The symmetric keys ski should be deleted from the printers after the RT i tables
have been decrypted.
A faster variant with a shorter permutation commitment
Although the above protocol is quite efficient, it still requires the WBB to do a lot of
computation to open all relevant commitments and reconstruct the ballot permutation
each time a print confirmation check occurs. This is unfortunate because we would like
to encourage ordinary voters to perform print confirmations by making them easy and
fast.
One way to speed up print confirming is to ask the printer to commit to the candidate-
list permutation pi directly when it generates the ballot, then ensure that this commitment
to pi is confirmed for proper generation (during ballot generation confirmations) and for
conformance with the ballot permutation (during print confirmations). During a print
confirmation check, the WBB needs only to open and verify the commitment to pi, then
sign it and return it to the printer. Every print confirmation check then triggers a ballot
generation confirmation check, which opens all the commitments just as described in
Section 4.2.2, but this does not have to be done while the voter is waiting for the print
confirmation check to complete.
Like other randomness values used by the printer, the randomness used in the com-
mitment must also be generated by the RGen servers, using a new column in each RT i
and CRT i table. The printer retrieves the random value the same way that it retrieves
all the others, and uses it to compute the commitment to pi. That commitment is sent,
along with ballot generation ciphers, to the WBB during the ballot generation stage. It
is also checked, along with the ciphers, during the ballot generation confirmations so we
gain a statistical assurance the commitments to the permutation are correct. During the
print confirmation check everything proceeds as described above, except the WBB only
has to open and check the commitment and then sign the permutation based on that.
This does not affect universal verifiability, because the same data linking the ballot
permutation to the commitments on the WBB is eventually published either way. How-
ever, the big advantage is it reduces the workload on the WBB during the critical time
that the voter is waiting for the signature on pi, since it can now defer the re-encryptions
necessary to verify the permutation.
More precisely, if we add the required random values into the n+ 1-th column of each
RT i, Algorithm 1 would now be:
Ballot generation confrimation check (Section 4.2.2) would be exactly as above. Addi-
tionally, anyone can recompute the randomness value the printer used to commit to the
candidate permutation pi, and hence open that commitment and check that it matches
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Algorithm 2: Deterministic Encryption by Printer with explicit WBB
commitment to pi.
for i = 1→ G do . Decrypt the symmetric keys from the RGenServers
ski ← DecSKP (eski)
end for
for j = 1→ b do . b is the number of ballots.
for k = 1→ n do . n is the number of candidates.
rand← SHA(SymmDecsk1(RT 1(j, k))‖ . . . ‖SymmDecskG(RTG(j, k)))
CTj,k ← EncPKE (candk; rand)
end for
CT(j) ← Sort(CT(j)) . CT(j) returns the entire row
permsj ← pi . pi is the permutation applied to sort CTj .
rand2← SHA(SymmDecsk1(RT 1(y, n+ 1))‖ . . . ‖SymmDecskG(RTG(y, n+ 1)))
commitpi ← c(pi; rand2)
end for
Send CT and commitpi to the WBB. to WBB.
the ballot permutation.
Print confirmation (Section 4.2.3) would be:
Voter: After collecting printed candidate list, remains at printer and requests a confirm-
ation check,
Printer: sends to the WBB the randomness to open the commitments to the randomness
on each CRT i used to generate the ballot in the ballot generation phase and the
randomness to open the commitment to pi.
WBB: (immediately) checks the serial number has not already been voted on or con-
firmed and if this is true, opens the commitment to pi, checks it, and if valid sends
a jointly signed copy of pi (or candidate names in permuted order) to the printer.
WBB: (later) opens all the commitments for this ballot, reconstructs the ballot, com-
putes the permutation pi, posts all the data on the public WBB.
The final step of opening all the other commitments reduces the total number of
confirmations that need to be done. If we relied entirely on the immediate check of
the serial number and the frequency of ballot generation confirmations, then the system
would still be universally verifiable, but the probability of the printer cheating successfully
would be higher.
Real-time Printer Replacement
If a printer is stolen or fails, all the ballots that had been generated by it are no longer
available for use. This is important because the “printer” is a small tablet PC that would
be easy to carry. Hence we need to have a suitable method for bringing replacement
equipment back online during election time. For example, we could bring the randomness
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generation servers back online each night, or when needed, to generate new randomness,
after having deleted those values they had already sent to printers. An alternative is for
the randomness generation authorities to do the same thing as described above for a few
extra as-yet-undeployed printers, put the data on the public WBB, and then ask each
one to send their ski to some (distinct) entity who is going to be online at voting time.
4.3. Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM)
The EBM is a computer that assists the user in filling in a Prêt à Voter ballot. The
device is already adequately described in the Introduction. The protocol for a user to
start the EBM to make it ready to receive a vote is given in Figure 4.11; and the protocol
for casting a vote once it has been provided to the EBM is given in Figure 4.12.
Voter EBMTablet Private WBB
serialNo,district,serialSig,commitTime,permutation
boothID,boothSig,serialNo,serialSig,“startevm”,district
serialNo,“startevm”,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
msc Start EBM
• boothSig : SignEBMTablet{“startevm”,serialNo,district}
• serialSig : SignWBB{serialNo,district}
• peerSig : SignWBB{“startevm”,serialNo,district}
Figure 4.11.: Start EBM Message Sequence Chart
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Voter EBMTablet Private WBB
serialNo,district,serialSig,commitTime,permutation
races,boothID,boothSig,serialNo,serialSig,“vote”,startEVMSig,district
serialNo,“vote”,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
serialNo,district,serialSig,permutation,peerID,peerSig,commitTime
msc Vote Message Sequence Chart
• boothSig : SignEBMTablet{serialNo,district,preferences}
• serialSig : SignWBB{serialNo,district}
• startEVMSig : SignWBB{“startevm”,serialNo,district}
• peerSig : SignWBB{serialNo,district,preferences,commitTime}
Figure 4.12.: Vote Message Sequence Chart
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4.4. Cancel Station
The Cancel Station is a supervised interface for cancelling a vote (identified by Serial
Number). This will be implemented on the same devices as the print-on-demand printers,
but remains conceptually distinct (and could easily be implemented on a separate device).
To request cancellation of a vote, a voter presents the printed candidate list to the
election staff. The candidate list contains the signed serial number, which is scanned
by the cancel station and passed to the Cancel Authority to run centrally. That cancel
authority constructs its own signature on the cancellation request and sends it back to
the Cancel Station. That cancel authorisation is then forwarded to the Bulletin Board
peers for inclusion on the bulletin board. A cancellation receipt is returned for the voter
to retain, signed by a threshold of the bulletin board peers. This protocol is illustrated in
Figure 4.13. A precise description of the surrounding procedures is given in Section 3.1.4.
It is important to emphasise that a vote is never cancelled unless the elector follows those
procedures.
Each Cancel Station has a (low) limit on the number of cancellations that may be
submitted through it before being checked by VEC HQ. Hence a malicious Cancel Station
incorrectly requesting cancellation of votes will not be able to cancel many before it is
under scrutiny. Furthermore the cancel requests may be revoked if they are discovered
to be flawed, and the votes can then be reinstated.
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Cancel Station Cancel Authority Private WBB
serialNo, serialSig,“cancelReq”, district, senderID, senderSignature
CancelAuthResp
boothID, boothSig, cancelAuthID, cancelAuthSig, serialNo, serialSig,“cancel”, district
serialNo, “cancel”, peerID, peerSig, commitTime
msc Cancellation
• senderSignature : SignV PS{“cancelReq”,serialNo,district}
• CancelAuthResp : SignCancelAuth{cancelAuthID,cancelAuthSig}
• boothSig : SignV PS{serialNo,“cancel”}
• cancelAuthSig : SignV PS{serialNo,“cancel”}
• serialSig : SignWBB{serialNo,district}
• peerSig : SignWBB{“cancel”,serialNo}
Figure 4.13.: Cancellation Message Sequence Chart
4.5. Mixnet
The system uses a re-encryption mixnet which produces a noninteractive, universally
verifiable proof of a shuffle and decryption (of encrypted votes) and posts it to the Public
WBB. The main advantage of the re-encryption (as opposed to decryption) mixnet is
that it separates the processes of shuffling and decryption. If one mix server blocks, it
can simply be removed and the mix re-run. Decryption works as long as a threshold of
key share holders remains available.
The current implementation uses Randomised Partial Checking [JJR02] with the modi-
fications proposed by Khazaei andWikström [KW13], including requiring all mixnet peers
to contribute to the randomly generated challenges.
Each division will be shuffled separately.
There will be a problem if the number of votes cast in a particular division (for ATL
or BTL) is too small to be an acceptable anonymity set. This is an unavoidable problem
that has nothing to do with the choice of mix protocol, though it is affected by the
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decision to allow receipts to reveal the choice of ATL or BTL. This means that that
data, along with the division name, will be revealed on the mix inputs, so each category
needs to be mixed separately. Some categories could be quite small. It will be up to the
administrators to decide how small an anonymity set must be before the disadvantages
of privacy compromise outweigh the advantages of public verifiability.
We would pad all votes going through the mix to the same length. If someone provides
27 preferences, but everyone else provides 36, we will pad the set of ciphers for the 27
to be the same length. The padding is a zero/null value that is agreed and published in
advance. That prevents trivially tracking the data through the mix. However, it does
not prevent matching a receipt of 27 preferences to a decryption of 27 preferences. See
Section 6.2.5 for a discussion of the options and implications.
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5. Robustness and recovery from failures
Section 3 described a series of checks that voters and others can perform to ensure in-
tegrity, but did not specify exactly what happens when any of these checks fail. It is
challenging in any voting system to recover from errors. A failure of check 1, 3 or 4 is
immediately demonstrable (assuming Check 3 is performed on the spot in the polling
place) and proves malfeasance by election authorities. This would have serious implica-
tions for the trustworthiness of the election result. It is less clear how seriously to regard
a failure of Check 2. Unfortunately there will be some rate of false alarms, in which voters
claim their vote was misrecorded when they simply misremembered it or changed their
minds. Hence a zero-tolerance policy is unworkable, even though any tolerance increases
the chances for vote manipulation. Whatever the level of tolerance, it is important that
ballots spoiled in this way remain secret, or the process can introduce opportunities for
coercion.
One simple fallback method, in the event of unacceptable failures including the loss of
network connectivity or complete device failure (e.g. a printer or EBM malfunctioning
irretrievably), is simply to stop using Prêt à Voter and use the EBM as a plain electronic
ballot marker.
5.1. Fallback to Plain EBM mode
The protocol requires the participation of the Private WBB. Intermittent loss of connec-
tion to the WBB will be handled by the communication infrastructure, but loss of the
network or the WBB will require fallback to a mode of operation that is purely local.
Since vVote is intended to operate alongside standard paper ballots (for 2014) the
fallback position will be to return to “plain Electronic ballot marker mode”: the EBM
machines will be used purely for constructing and printing a paper ballot which can then
be cast with the standard paper ballots. This would contain the voter’s preferences in
boxes beside candidate names (and parties/groups) listed in the offical order, without
the serial number or any other identifying information. The result would look as much
like the manually-completed paper ballots as possible given the printer available.1
No receipts will be issued and the vote will not be submitted through vVote. The
Print on Demand service is not used at all for plain EBM voting.
This provides simple cast-as-intended verification, but no more evidence than the or-
dinary paper system that the vote was properly (transported and) included in the count.
1Legislation specifies certain formatting rules for ballots, so technically speaking these would not be
ballots, but some sort of summary representation of the voter’s intention that could be counted
manually in place of a ballot.
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In other words, this system is software independent but still depends on procedures in
the polling place and possibly in the transport of paper votes. This is a reasonable fall-
back in the event that vVote is unavailable, particularly for voters who would require
assistance to complete a paper ballot manually.
Of course if there had been a complete power failure then all voters could have reverted
to paper voting.
5.2. Recovery from other failures
The rest of this section describes recovery strategies from failures that are not so over-
whelming as to motivate reverting to plain EBM mode. To date little work has been done
on robustness, which mainly concerns analysing and providing safeguards against possible
system faults. We define robustness of an e-voting system as the ability to tolerate fail-
ure of any of its components. On the practical level, recovery from failure/misbehaviour
should also be timely.
The importance of adequate recovery measures is highlighted when a system is deployed
for the real world. Provision for occurrences such as network or power outages, device
malfunction, etc., that do not feature significantly in theoretical work becomes a more
pressing requirement. Something as apparently innocent yet all too real as a printer
breaking down could, for instance, bring voting to a standstill, no matter how secure the
protocol is proven otherwise.
As might be expected for complex systems which require a high level of security and
reliability, the task of accounting for all possible failures in an e-voting system is extremely
involved, and demands rigorous attention to detail. It is crucial that any authority
running an election is ready with appropriate procedures to deal with any deviations
from a normal protocol that may occur: from the seemingly mundane, such as printers
running out of paper to the more serious, such as errors in device digital signatures.
Officials should keep detailed records of device and procedural failures of any kind.
Repeated and/or widespread occurrences, e.g. in the device failing to sign receipts may
necessitate de-commissioning and replacing a device, and forensic examination to de-
termine the possible cause. The authority may need to specify a number for each type
of failure, after which further investigation is carried out.
We will walk through the vVote voting ceremony and consider the various error states
that may arise, and the possible remedial procedures to ensure robustness of the system.
Many of the circumstances require a vote to be cancelled, which has its own special set
of procedures, described in Section 3.1.4.
We assume there is an established procedure for registering and authenticating voters
at the polling station, for example marking off the electoral roll on production of some
recognised form of identification or claim of identity. This may not be trivial if the
register is electronic, in which case it may be affected by a network or power outage (but
this is out of scope).
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5.3. Potential failures in ballot generation or ballot printing
confirmation
The authority should encourage voters and third parties who may wish to confirm ballots
during either the ballot construction phase or the voting phase.
Print station: does not work, either for printing or for confirming, or does not print a
valid WBB signature on the ballot:
Persistent device failure has been discussed in Section 5.1.
A printer that occasionally fails to produce a proof of correct opening in response
to a confirmation request should be treated with suspicion. In the absence of
a good reason for expecting network failures (preventing the print station from
contacting the private WBB), the assumption should be that the ballot is not
properly formed. The threshold for replacing such a printer should be low. A
printer that had printed a malformed ballot would not necessarily fail by proving
that the ballot was malformed—more likely, it would fail to provide a proof at all.
Ballot is incorrectly formed: Finding inconsistencies in ballot formation could poten-
tially occur during pre-election checking, or during voter-initiated checking during
the voting phase.
A printed ballot with a proper WBB signature but a candidate list that is inconsist-
ent with the cryptographic information opened in a confirmation check, represents
a serious failure of the system. The affected device should not be used.
5.4. Potential failures in the voting ceremony
After obtaining a printed ballot for voting, the voter interacts with an EBM and
possibly a device that checks and verifies the WBB signatures. Potential failures and
possible recovery measures are discussed below. There are several different potential
failures, but they may be difficult to distinguish and hence have similar responses.
5.4.1. Demonstrable EBM malfunctions
The preference receipt is invalid For example, it is blank or it contains repeated num-
bers. This is an EBM error.
EBM receipt is printed but does not contain a valid digital signature: This is also an
EBM error. An invalid or absent signature may be the result of simple device mal-
function, but it may also have more serious implications such as failure to upload
the vote to the WBB, or incorrect recording on the WBB.
Recommended action in both cases:
• The vote should be cancelled, then
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• The voter should be issued with a fresh ballot and allowed to cast another
vote.
• The EBM should be removed from use until the problem is resolved.
These steps should be auditable, i.e. it should be possible for voters and third parties
to check cancelled votes on the WBB. See Section 4.4 for details of procedures.
5.4.2. Apparent malfunctions that may be due to voter, EBM, or private
WBB error
In all of these cases, it is possible that the EBM malfunctioned but also possible that a
voter did not follow the instructions correctly, or claimed that the EBM malfunctioned
when it did not.
The EBM does not print a preference receipt The elector cannot know if the VEC
captured their vote as they intended it because they cannot verify it.
The preferences receipt is different to what the elector expects Note that this is in-
distinguishable from an elector who is mistaken, frustrated or dissatisfied claiming
that their receipt is different when in fact the device functioned correctly.
Recommended action in both cases:
• The vote should be cancelled, then
• The voter should be issued with a fresh ballot and allowed to cast another
vote.
It is not possible to tell whether the failure was due to the EBM failing to send the
correct vote, or a network failure, or the private WBB failing to sign and return what it
received. Vote cancellation and re-voting are the most appropriate actions as the system
may have failed to record the vote. However, it would be premature to remove the EBM
from service following only a small number of accusations of this sort of behaviour. The
authority may decide to treat sporadic, or a small number of errors as simple anomalies
or voter mistakes. However, the authority should investigate the cause of a large number
of reported errors.
5.5. Potential failures in post-election checking
Vote is incorrectly recorded on the WBB or absent from WBB: On discovering such
an error, a voter can lodge a complaint. The first step would be for an official to
check the reported error and the WBB signature on the receipt. If the vote is in-
deed wrongly recorded, and the voter has a validly signed receipt, this represents a
serious system failure which implies that more than the assumed maximum number
of private WBB peers have been compromised.
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A voter who makes this complaint without a validly signed receipt does not have
a strong case.
Final tally proof does not verify: An error found post-publication is more likely to be
caused by a technical problem e.g., in uploading, than in the actual calculation.
Clearly, the error would have to be investigated, the problem located and a solution
sought. While it is potentially very serious, possibly indicating failure in the “back-
end” processing, it could also be the result of a minor error that is easily fixed by,
for example, uploading missing data.
If no simple error is found, it should be possible to identify the mix servers whose
proofs were not valid (or not present) and rerun the mix without them, eventually
producing a valid, verifiable proof.
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6. Security Claims and analysis
Security requirements for voting systems fit into two main categories: integrity properties
and privacy properties. We give a brief overview here and then more detail on each set
of properties.
For sighted voters, the protocol includes no human or electronic components which
must be trusted for integrity, apart from trusting that each eligible voter is allowed to
cast at most one vote, and that only eligible voters can vote. It does of course rely on
voters to perform some checks (an auditing assumption), which are detailed in Section 3.
It assumes that they can find at least one honest device to view the bulletin board, check
signatures and verify ballot confirmations. Invalid ballots, in which the candidate list does
not match the encrypted ciphertexts on the WBB, are detected at ballot confirmation by
Check 1. Check 2 detects incorrect vote printing by the EBM. Incorrect vote submission
by the EBM before submission to the private WBB is detected by Check 3. Check 4
detects vote substitution by the WBB. Incorrect mixing or decryption would be detected
because the proofs of correct mixing and decryption are public.
The vision-impaired voter is unable to do Check 2, that the EBM printed the correct
ballot. She cannot ask for human assistance without destroying privacy. This leads to a
distribution of trust over the machines in the polling place: she can check her vote on as
many machines as she likes, and must assume that at least one of the machines she uses
is honest.
Some vision impaired voters have good enough vision to check their printout directly,
just like ordinary voters, without using a second EBM. The harder it is for a cheating
EBM to predict who will check directly, the harder it is to get away with cheating.
The protocol not only detects, but also provides evidence of many kinds of failures,
including the failure of ballot generation confirmations and the failure of a properly pro-
duced receipt to appear on the bulletin board. In both cases, a voter who experiences
such a failure has a WBB digital signature that proves that the system malfunctioned.
This provides two kinds of benefits: voters can demonstrate to a court that a real mal-
function occurred, but it is not feasible to pretend that a malfunction occured when it
did not. This is important in defending against the “defaming attack” in which people
pretend to have detected a system failure which did not actually happen. Of course,
there can be no proof that the EBM accurately represented the voter’s intention: that
step is dependent on the voter’s testimony and hence is to an extent vulnerable to the
“defaming” attack.
Privacy of the contents of each receipt depends on the assumption that at least two
RGen Server generate randomness correctly and keep it secret. Further, that a threshold
set of those who share the keys is honest. If these assumptions hold, then the receipt
itself does not leak information about the voter’s preferred candidates (though it does
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show how many preferences they listed, and whether they voted ATL or BTL).
Provided that that two assumptions holds, the system has some defence against klep-
tographic attacks on the receipt [GKK+06]. This is because the receipt’s random data
is generated in a distributed way, and the entities that do the printing (the printer and
the EBM) are deterministic. Thus information cannot be leaked in the ballot data itself
without some chance of detection, though it could be subtly leaked in slight font changes
or other printing effects.
Privacy of the votes also depends on the privacy of the mixing protocol. If the mix is
secure, then the tallying protocol does not add any information about the link between
a receipt and its vote. RPC challenges are constructed so that overall anonymity across
the mix is preserved.
The system is also receipt-free, meaning that it does not provide a person with in-
formation to prove how she voted. However, there are coercion attacks on this protocol,
including the “Italian attack.” These, along with other important details, are described
below. We concentrate first on integrity properties and then discuss the subtleties of
privacy.
This protocol is meant to achieve two main classes of security properties: integrity and
privacy. The claims are given here and their informal justification is given below.
6.1. Integrity properties
vote integrity: meaning that all attempts to manipulate the votes are detectable by
confirmation checks or other audits.1
non-repudiation: meaning that failures can not only be detected, but (in most cases)
demonstrated. In particular, failures of the private WBB to post something it has
accepted on the public WBB can be proven by producing the signed accepted item
(whether a signed ballot confirmation or a signed receipt for a submitted vote).
This also defends the system against people falsely claiming to have detected an
error.
prevention of ballot stuffing: meaning that (under a threshold assumption, and a pro-
cedural assumption for voter markoff) only votes entered via the legitimate interface
are included in the count.
Defences against ballot stuffing using the legitimate interface (e.g. by unauthorised
people gaining access to a legitimate polling place) are not part of the system and
must be defended against by procedural mechanisms.
Procedures must prevent voters from taking someone else’s ballot off the printer and
hence voting in the wrong division.
1Of course this does not imply that they will always be detected, if the appropriate checks are not
performed on the manipulated ballot. The claim is that any manipulation can in principle be detected
if a check is performed.
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6.1.1. Justification of Integrity claims
Vote integrity based on confirmations
An informal argument for the integrity of each person’s vote is:
• The ballot-generation confirmation checks that the ballot is a permutation of properly-
encrypted candidate identifiers.
• The ballot-printing confirmation checks that the printed list of candidate names
matches the encrypted candidate identifiers on the WBB.
• The voter’s check of the EBM’s printout confirms that the correct numbers (or
other marks) are recorded against the correct candidate names.
• The signature check confirms that the printed number sequence matches what was
submitted to the WBB.
• The check of the vote on the WBB confirms that the correct ciphertexts were
used (in the case of a larger-than-necessary generated ballot) and that the vote
submitted to the WBB was posted.
• verifying the shuffling and decryption proof from the mixnet confirms that the
announced output votes match those posted (encrypted) on the WBB.
Of course the first two confirmations are performed only on ballots that are not sub-
sequently voted on. The argument is that any attempt to manipulate the vote by gen-
erating or printing invalid votes will be detected by with some probability that depends
on the confirmations being numerous and unpredictable.
6.1.2. Selecting Ballots for Confirmations and Audits
Clearly it is important that we use a suitable source of randomness for the selection of
the ballots to do the confirmation checks. Some combination of public confirming (with
officials, scrutineers, observers, and a public source of randomness such as dice or lotto
balls) with voter-initiated confirmation checks (in which any voter may choose to confirm
ballot construction or printing) would be ideal. This will require further investigation
to see what procedures are possible in practice. The argument about the integrity of
the results of the election depends on all steps of the confirming process having been
performed diligently, including those that the voters have to do themselves.
Of course, it is difficult to compute the appropriate amount of confirming for an
IRV/STV election, especially in advance [MRSW11, Car11]. This question will have
to be addressed for the project, but is out of scope for this paper. We expect that most
of the IRV (i.e. single-seat) contests will have a relatively easy margin computation in
practice. However, the full STV contests are a different matter and require significant
further thought. One possibility is to announce the result, explain what quantity of
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cheating might have been possible given reasonable estimates of the amount of confirm-
ing that was done, and ask any election challenger to demonstrate a set of votes in which
they win a seat and the number of changed votes is reasonably probable given the rate
of checking.2
A Bayesian method of bounding the total number of errors for a particular confidence
level, given a particular quantity of confirming, is given in Appendix A.
6.1.3. Properties of different kinds of mixnet
This design is largely independent of the kind of mixnet chosen to shuffle and decrypt
the votes. However, it inherits the privacy properties of the mixnet it uses. The cur-
rent implementation uses Randomised Partial Checking [JJR02], adapted according to
recommendations by Khazaei and Wikström [KW13]. As described in Section 4.5, RPC
mixnets allow a small but non-negligible probability of successful cheating, which de-
creases exponentially with the number of substituted votes.
Our implementation is designed to allow cheating only if the entire set of mixers collude
to cheat, because they all work together to compute their challenges. Even if they all
do, a given probability of detection requires an amount of precomputation work that is
exponential in the number of substituted votes.
We intend to continue to evaluate whether a mixnet based on zero knowledge proofs
such as Verificatum [Wik12] will be feasible to use in future.
6.1.4. Other integrity properties
Serial Number uniqueness and defence against the “clash attack”
The “clash attack” [KTV12] is a vote dropping technique that applies to many crypto-
graphic voting schemes. An attacker (as a server or ballot generator) arranges to give
several different voters identical receipts. All affected voters see their receipt appear on
the public WBB, and yet only one vote has been counted. In our protocol, the serial
numbers are carefully generated to guarantee their uniqueness (See Section 4.2.2), but
this doesn’t prevent a corrupt printer from printing off exactly the same ballot, with the
same Serial Number, for many different voters. The printer would have to collude with a
corrupt EBM that merely reused the private WBB signature, without resubmitting mul-
tiple instances of the same vote to the WBB. There are two reasons that this represents
an acceptable risk.
• The attack works only if the voters subsequently cast identical votes—otherwise the
cheating EBM will be unable to produce a valid signature on the receipt, and unable
to post it to the WBB. (The attack is in general harder for Prêt à Voter than for
direct-encrypting schemes such as Helios and Wombat, because the attacker must
commit to the identical ballot before learning the person’s vote.)
• The attack is detectable by ballot printing audit, which would fail because the
ballot has already been voted on.
2Thanks to Ron Rivest for this suggestion.
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Overall this attack is no more effective, requires more conspirators, and has a higher
probability of detection than the simple misalignment of the candidate names on the
ballot by a corrupt printer. Hence it is appropriate (i.e. conservative) to include this
attack implicitly in computations quantifying the extent of ballot misprinting, without
explicitly counting it.
Non-repudiation and defence against the “defaming attack”
Every legitimate receipt includes a WBB signature on the SerialNumber, preferences
and division. Voters are encouraged to check the signature before leaving the polling
place. If a voter can produce such a receipt without it appearing on the WBB, then this
demonstrates that the Private WBB has malfunctioned. Conversely, accusations that a
particular receipt was properly submitted remain unconvincing when the claimed receipt
does not have a valid WBB signature.
Ballot generation and printing confirmations can demonstrably fail, or demonstrably
succeed, or fail silently (e.g. when the device being confirmed simply stops). In other
words, if a voter claims to have received an invalid opening of a printed ballot, then that
should be demonstrable because a printed ballot should have a valid WBB signature.
However, if a voter claims to have attempted to confirm a ballot but not received a
result, this cannot be checked.
Misprinting of voter intention by the EBM cannot be demonstrated, because only the
voter knows what they truly entered. Consequently, accusations of incorrect printing
cannot be repudiated—the evidence that a particular machine is misbehaving needs to
consist of a series of observations and comparisons with other machines.
Prevention of ballot stuffing
The private WBB enforces that votes may only be uploaded to the WBB by a legitimate
EBM casting a vote that has been properly printed and signed. In other words, a
colluding printer and EBM could stuff the ballot, but this would be detected by the
reconciling of markoff data with the number of submitted ballots described in Section 3.
Also (a threshold of peers of) the private WBB could stuff the ballot, by pretending
to have received a legitimate signed vote, but again this is detected by reconciling with
markoff data.
It is not possible to include the EBM signature on the public WBB because the protocol
does not guarantee that the same signature has been sent to all private WBB peers.
6.2. Privacy properties
privacy The system hides how each person voted, under assumptions stated below.
It does reveal whether the person voted above or below the line, and how many
preferences they expressed. This could potentially be used to coerce certain types
of voting (such as a vote for a particular number of preferences), but it would not
be possible to coerce a particular political effect. Although this could have been
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avoided, the opportunities for coercion are very limited, and hence did not justify
the extra difficulty for voters of a more complicated protocol that kept it secret.
receipt freeness Even a voter who deliberately colludes with a coercer cannot prove after
voting how they voted (except by major violations of enforced procedures, such as
taking a photo of their candidate list). Note that this implies that a voted ballot
cannot also be confirmed.
resistance to kleptographic attacks A printer attempting to leak information via the
WBB data will be detected with some probability.
It is not intended to defend against “Italian attacks” (in which the voter is coerced into
producing a vote matching a detectable pattern) or randomisation attacks (in which a
voter is coerced to produce a receipt of a particular form, which has a random effect on
the actual vote). The coercion attack described in Kelsey et al. [KRMC10] Sec 4.3 is
also possible, but so complicated for this scheme that it would be very far from the most
effective way to coerce voters. It is not worth defending against a coercion attack that
is harder to execute and no more effective than the “Italian attack” already possible in
the existing paper system.
Defences against coercion associated with failing to shred the candidate list must be
enforced by procedural mechanisms. Similarly, deliberate uses of out-of-band recording
technology (such as taking a photo of the candidate list before shredding it) or side-
channel information leakage (from the EBM or printer) must be defended against by
mechanisms outside the vVote system.
vVote also contains some technical and procedural measures, which are unrelated to
Prêt à Voter, for defending against chain voting. These are described in Section 3.1.5.
6.2.1. Justification of privacy claims
The following coalitions can violate ballot privacy for an individual:
• The printer that generated and produced that ballot,
• All but one of the RGen servers,
• The EBM the voter used,
• However many mix servers are necessary for breaking shuffling privacy, depending
on the mixnet being used,
• A threshold of key sharing authorities,
The crucial claim is that smaller coalitions cannot. This is expanded into several
specific claims below.
Clearly if the printer leaks its information it can violate vote privacy for everyone who
used a ballot it printed. This means that practical opportunities for compromising the
printer must be reduced as much as possible, e.g. turning off the wireless connection.
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Apart from the printer and an electronic ballot marker (if there is one), no other single
entity can violate vote privacy. This is justified in two claims below.
Claim 1 A collusion of all but two randomness generation authorities does not have
sufficient information to recover the ballot permutation (in polynomial time with non-
negligible probability).
Clearly if all the randomness generation authorities collude and share their information,
they learn the contents of all ballots. If at least two choose their random values correctly
and keep them secret until the others have committed, and if the others can be forced
to open their commitments, the resulting list of random values has 2k = 2 ∗ 256 bits of
entropy.
NIST [BK12] states that the SHA family of hashes are suitable as randomness extract-
ors. In [BK12] it states that when using a hash function F in which Y = F (S||A) then
“If the input string S was assessed at 2n bits of min-entropy or more (i.e., m ≥ 2n),
then Y may be considered to have n bits of full entropy output”. The value of A can be
anything, including null, it is just additional data. This tells us that provided at least
two mix servers provide good randomness values the output from the hashes will have
k = 256 bits of entropy.
The usual subtlety arises if we consider the possibility that some authorities might use
blocking to bias the output, i.e. might wait until learning the other authorities’ random
values and refuse to open their own commitments if they did not like the result. (This
could happen, for instance, in collusion with a corrupt printer.) This is why true coin-
tossing protocols are more complicated than the simple one in this proposal. In practice,
such a blocking authority would be removed quickly without having the opportunity to
affect many bits of the output.
Clearly the same argument holds for the PRNG construction of Section 4.2.2, given
appropriate assumptions about the PRNG.
Claim 2 The posted ballots on the WBB reveal, for each receipt, whether the vote was
ATL or BTL and how many preferences were cast, but no other information, unless a
threshold of key sharers colludes.
Claim 3 The mixing process anonymises votes within anonymity sets defined by their
division, ATL/BTL choice, and length of preference list. The assumptions about mixnet
collusion for privacy violations depend on the mixnet being used.
For example, in RPC, if all but one pair of mix servers exposes their permutation, then
each anonymity set is half the total being mixed.
In a mixnet based on zero knowledge proofs, votes are anonymised within the whole
set if at least one mix server remains honest.
Our system is not susceptible to the replay attack described in [KW13] because all
ballots are pregenerated in a distributed fashion.
62
6.2.2. Kleptographic attacks
The output of the printers is entirely determined by the randomness that is sent to them,
and other publicly committed information given in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Hence they have
no opportunity to provide any information which may be skewed in a particular way.
Correct information posted therefore cannot leak information from the printer. Incorrect
information will be detected with some non-negligible probability by the ballot-generation
confirmation processes.
Although the whole group of randomness generation authorities can collude to mount
a kleptographic attack, a similar argument to that for vote privacy shows that a smaller
collusion has insufficient information.
6.2.3. Receipt freeness
Receipt freeness is a subtle property and we do not have a formal argument for it.
However, the main idea behind Prêt à Voter is to provide the voter with either a proof
of the contents of a ballot’s encrypted values, or an opportunity to vote on the ballot,
but never both for the same ballot. In other words, a ballot that’s allowed to be voted
on should never have revealed the random values used to produce it.
The threat of using the confirmation process to expose the contents of a ballot that
has been voted on is ameliorated by the electronic locking process described in Sec 4.2.3.
A voter could attempt to collude with a corrupt printer to produce a receipt, and could
promise not to perform a ballot printing confirmation check, but the incorrect formation
of the ballot necessary to produce such a receipt would be caught by a ballot construction
confirmation check with some probability.
6.2.4. Privacy Threats Ameliorated By Procedural Controls
As the voter inputs her choices into the EBM, the device necessarily “learns” how she
voted. The potential for the EBM to leak vote information clearly raises privacy issues.
Any data stored in the EBM’s memory should be deleted, ideally after each session.
Prêt à Voter introduces a privacy threat that does not exist for either standard paper
voting or for DRE’s with VVPAT: someone may discover and record an unvoted ballot’s
candidate order and look up code, then learn the vote choices when they are later posted
on the WBB. Therefore there should be procedural controls to protect both the paper
printout and the electronic data on the printer from observation by anyone but the voter.
As for any voting system, computerised or paper-based, voters may ask for assistance
at a point that potentially violates their privacy simply because the assistant sees what
the voter has already written or entered. This threat to privacy however, exists in the
current system.
6.2.5. Privacy issues arising from small populations and complex ballots
Sometimes vote privacy is unachieveable: if everyone in one polling place votes the same
way, and results for that polling place are observed or announced alone, then vote privacy
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is not possible. It is possible that some divisions will have very few vVote voters.
The small populations exacerbate existing problems caused by the complexity of Vic-
torian ballots. It is easy for a voter (or a coercer) to choose a BTL vote that is highly
likely to be unique. If the BTL votes are made public, this allows a voter to prove how
they voted.
Since vVote receipts expose whether the person voted ATL or BTL, and how many
preferences they expressed, this problem is exacerbated again: it may be possible to
identify a vote uniquely based on its division and number of BTL preferences. If only
one person cast a particular number of preferences below the line in a division, that
person’s vote would have to be withheld from publicly verifiable decryption.
Some techniques exist for ameliorating some of these problems, such as proposals
for verifiable privacy-preserving tallying using (more) mixing and homomorphic sums
[BMN+09, Hea07]. However, these may not be efficient enough to use in practice. More
importantly, they work only on a complete list of votes, while the vVote votes need to
be input into an (unencrypted) existing VEC counting system.
This leaves us with some ad hoc approaches that are highly dependent on how many
people vote in each division, how close the election result is, and what anonymity
thresholds are deemed acceptable. The problem could be mitigated by doing on-demand
decryption of the packed candidate IDs, so we only decrypt the next pack when the
previous one has been eliminated. However, that still does not guarantee that privacy
will be preserved, since if all preferences are counted the full information will be made
public anyway.
6.2.6. Other possible attacks
“Psychological” attacks are a potential threat. As an example, a coercer manages to con-
vince voters that he is able to decrypt their receipts and find out how they voted [RP05].
Voter education could mitigate this attack; however psychological attacks will be a prob-
lem for virtually any end-to-end verifiable system.
6.3. Conclusion, report on the deployment, and future work
For the vVote system we have taken the original design concept of Prêt à Voter, and
extended and customised it to the requirements of the State of Victoria, Australia. This
practical deployment entailed a whole suite of technical and procedural problems not
previously addressed in the academic literature. We have developed novel solutions to
make the design applicable to the particular aspects of the target election while main-
taining end-to-end verifiability, notably: the introduction of electronic ballot markers for
capturing and casting votes; the requirements of preference voting whereby candidates
are ranked in order of preference rather than simply selected; the design of a secure
and robust web bulletin board; the requirement to print ballot papers on demand at
polling places while preserving the assurances that their cryptographic construction is
correct; and designing the system around procedures that are straightforward for voters
and pollworkers to follow.
64
This paper has described the general background and motivation for the system, and
its human processes and cryptographic protocols, motivated how these tie in to other
design decisions. Finally the paper has considered the system from a robustness point
of view, and has provided a security analysis of the system with particular emphasis on
the privacy and integrity provided by the system.
6.3.1. Report on the deployment
The system successfully took 1121 votes. During the deployment, six e-votes were can-
celled. This seems to have been due to networking problems. All the affected voters
subsequently cast a paper ballot.
Many divisions had too few e-votes for publication, and hence were not verifiable. This
is a result of limited deployment, not a protocol flaw, and would disappear if more people
used the system.
This project ran on a constrained budget on a very firm timetable dictated by the
election cycle. Certain tradeoffs were forced by timing, and by the current availability of
certain tools, but do not necessarily represent the best in the long term. For example,
the unified scanner and EBM could be revisited with better tools for printing and better
optical character recognition on the scanner. Also the choice of mixnet could be reviewed
if a more efficient zero-knowledge open source mix becomes available.
Numbers were undetermined until the last minute and so the system was developed
to handle a much larger number of voters than it eventually actually did. Many of the
design tradeoffs and developments meant for larger numbers, such as the agreeement
algorithm for the private WBB, were not necessary for the numbers we actually had.
6.3.2. Reflections on putting it into practice, with suggestions for future
improvements
Usability
There is a tension between verifiability, privacy and usability. For professional adminis-
trators who actually have to run an election, usability is the overwhelming priority. This
includes usability for voters and for the temporary staff hired to conduct the election on
the day. In practice any working system has to be usable. Although we had put signi-
ficant effort into a design that was easy for voters to use, the polling-place procedures
need to be simpler if this is to be more widely deployed. The challenge is to retain the
usability, while also providing verifiability and privacy.
There is an important link between verifiability, usability, and the practicalities of
organising a polling place. For example, the electoral commission was able to conduct
quite extensive ballot construction audits, because this could be performed before polls
opened, at a time when there was not enormous pressure from other tasks. However,
ballot printing confirmations were much more problematic, requiring a voter to pause
just at the critical point when they were about to go and vote. An important item of
future work is to redesign the ballot printing confirmations so as to make them easier to
perform without getting in the way of the main voting process.
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The protocol uses signature checking to achieve non-repudiation in many circum-
stances, particularly to allow voters to prove that their receipts are properly accepted by
the private WBB. In practice signature checking is complicated, both the procedures in
the polling place and the prior work necessary to download the app. Alternative weaker
but simpler methods of preventing the defaming attack, such as anti-counterfeiting pa-
per, or franking or stamping of receipts in the polling place, might offer better usability
for only slightly reduced security.
Vision impaired voters and assumptions
If the system is used more widely, this would reduce the importance of the current
assumption that vision impaired voters can find a non-colluding EBM in the same polling
place as the one they used to vote. The original intention was that the system would
be used for a wide class of voters, including disabled ones, and that the effect of some
able-bodied voters conducting audits would thus be shared by those who were unable
to conduct them themselves. However, this first deployment was not extended to non-
disabled voters within the state, which left us with the choice between inviting such
voters to verify with their own device (a serious practical risk to privacy) or to rely on
another device in the same polling place (which is far from ideal) or not at all (and rely
on being indistinguishable from sighted voters). It was decided to rely on the second
device in the polling place, mainly because this is a harmless and additive assumption.
Furthermore, even in this deployment some eligible voters were perfectly able to read
their own printout—the possibility of some such voters checking their printout directly
might deter an attack by colluding EBMs in the same polling place.
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A. Audit Sample Sizes and Confidence
Levels: a Bayesian Analysis
In vVote there are several stages of processing the ballots and votes which are checked
by sampling: ballot generation, ballot printing, printing of preferences, posting the pref-
erences on the web bulletin board, and mixing by the re-encryption mixnet. This section
considers the rate of sampling necessary at each of these stages in order to make state-
ments about the probability of there having been an undetected attack altering sufficient
ballots to change the result.
Stages are checked by sampling: selecting some of the ballots/votes being processed,
and checking that they have been processed correctly. If a ballot passes a check then it
has not been altered. The stages to check are as follows:
Ballot generation: Cut and choose: ballots are sampled and checked that the candidate
identities have been encrypted correctly. Sampled ballots are not used for voting,
since the confirmation check would break secrecy of the ballot. This check is carried
out by the authorities during the ballot generation phase.
Ballot printing: Cut and choose: printed ballots can be challenged by a voter, who can
have it checked that the printed candidate list has been correctly printed. Checked
printed ballots are not used for voting since secrecy would be lost. This check is
carried out by the individual voters.
Printing of preferences: Voters check that the preferences on their signed printed receipt
are in the correct order. Carried out by individual voters.
Checking the WBB: Voters check that the entry on the WBB matches their receipt.
Carried out by individual voters.
Mixnet: Randomised partial checking of the links in the mixnet. Carried out by the
authorities.
We are interested in the claims we can make when all of these checks are successful.
The kind of claim we wish to make is that given a sampling rate of r and no
failed checks, the probability that at least F votes were altered is no more
than p. Typically F will be some small fraction of the total number of votes cast. The
value F of interest may be the smallest number of votes necessary to change the result.
The converse is straightforward to calculate: if F votes are altered, then the probability
that this is not detected by sampling at rate r will be (1− r)F (see Appendix A.2). We
can then use Bayes’ theorem to obtain the probability that there is an attack given that
the sampling does not find any cheating, as follows:
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Given a prior (pre-sampling) probability q that there has been an attack affecting F
ballots, we can calculate the probability p that there has been an attack affecting F
ballots given the sampling. This is given by the following Bayesian formula, which is
explained more fully in Section A.3:
p =
(1− r)F . q
(1− r)F . q + (1− q) (A.1)
A.1. Digression: combining confirmations of different stages
Given stages 1 to n, to change a total of F votes an adversary may change some votes at
each stage, to a total of F . We consider Fi votes changed at stage i, where F1+. . .+Fn =
F .
Each stage may have a different rate of sampling. At stage i we consider the rate of
sampling to be ri. The probability that the sampling at stage i will not find any of the
Fi altered ballots is (1− ri)Fi . Hence the overall probability p0 that none of the attacked
ballots will be discovered will be p0 = (1− r1)F1 .(1− r2)F2 . . . . .(1− rn)Fn .
Let rJ be the least of all the rates. Then (replacing each ri by rJ), p is bounded above
by (1 − rJ)F . Hence we have the highest probability that none of the attacked ballots
will be discovered when we make all the changes in the stage with the lowest sampling
rate.
Hence when we identify a sampling rate required to achieve particular assurances, we
require that the identified rate will be the minimum that any of the stages have. This
means that in all the stages of ballot processing which involve auditing, the sampling
must be at the level of at least at the required rate.
Note that the RPC check of the mixnet requires a different argument because it is
links in the mix rather than individual ballots that are checked. In practice the best
known attack on mixnet integrity allows a vote to be altered with a 25% probability of
detection, and can thus be treated as a 25% rate of sampling. In practice this will be
higher than the sampling in the other stages.
Figure A.1.: Calculations of probability of fraud given no fraudulent ballots in sample
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A.1.1. Example
Figure A.1 gives an example table, considering the probability for F = 100 of fraudulent
ballots given a percentage sample size which finds no fraudulent ballots, and for various
a priori probabilities of attack.
For example, suppose that we have an a priori expectation from our other information
(e.g. no other circumstantial evidence of any attack behaviour) that there is at most a
5% chance of an attack, so q = 0.05. Suppose also that r = 3% and that F = 100. Then
we have (1− r)F = 0.05, and we obtain p = 0.002.
In other words, if we sample 3% of the ballots, and we find no fraudulent ones, and
we also estimate that there is no more than a 5% probability of an attack, then the
probability of there being an attack on 100 ballots given the sampling is 0.002 = 0.2%.
If the prior probability of an attack was at the higher value of 10% then after the
sampling the probability of there having been an attack will be 0.5%.
A.1.2. Required sampling rates
In practice we will start with a number F of fraudulent ballots that we want to make a
claim about; a judgement on the prior probability q of an attack; and a confidence level
1−p that we want a sample check to give us. Then we can calculate the rate of sampling
that we need. This is given in Figure A.2 for confidence level 99.5%, and in Figure A.3
for confidence level 95%.
We can see from the chart how the level of sampling required changes with the prior
probability q of cheating, particularly as F increases. For example we can see that if
there is a 10% prior probability of cheating, and we are concerned with whether F = 100
ballots have been changed, then we need to sample 3.0% of the ballots, and find no
cheating, to be able to conclude with 99.5% confidence that this level of cheating has not
occurred: in other words, the probability that there was no attack is 99.5% given that
this level of sampling finds no cheating. However, we see that even with an extremely
high prior probability of cheating of 50%, we still only need to sample 5.2% of the ballots
to achieve the same level of confidence that cheating has not occurred.
For a 95% confidence level of no cheating on F = 100 and a prior probability of 10%
cheating, Figure A.3 shows that we only need to sample 0.7% of the votes.
Conversely, Figure A.4 is appropriate for post-hoc analysis: given a value of F , and an
observed level of sampling, the table gives the probability of there having been cheating
to the level of F altered ballots for a prior probability of 5%.
Note that it is the voters themselves who decide to check the printing of the ballots,
and who decide whether to confirm their votes on the WBB, so the rate of confirmation
checks for ballot printing cannot be decided in advance. However, mitigations such as
additional print confirmation checks can be carried out by “mystery shoppers” to achieve
the required rate.
Reconsider the Bentleigh 2010 example with a winning margin of 522 votes. Following
our analysis, if there is no evidence of any attack then we might reasonably bound the
prior probability of cheating at 10%, (though this figure would require some careful
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Figure A.2.: Sampling rates required to achieve 99.5% probability that that there was
no cheating to the level of F altered ballots.
Figure A.3.: Sampling rates required to achieve 95% probability that that there was no
cheating to the level of F altered ballots.
Figure A.4.: Probability that that there was no cheating to the level of F altered ballots
for given sampling rates, with a prior probability of cheating of 5%.
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consideration and seems at the high end). Figure A.3 shows us that for a 95% confidence
level of no attack we need only sample 0.3% In fact a sampling rate of 1.2% gives a
confidence level of 99.5%, as shown in Figure A.2.
A.2. Probability that a sample passes the check given F
fraudulent ballots
Define:
N The total population size (total number of ballots)
S The sample size: the number of ballots we will check
F The number of fraudulent (incorrectly constructed) ballots we are concerned about.
r The sample rate: sample size as a proportion of the total population size: r = S/N .
We’ll also assume that F  N : that a very small proportion of the total ballots are
fraudulent.
If there are F fraudulent ballots out of N it the following calculation determines the
probability that a sample size of S will not include any of the F fraudulent ballots:
p = ΠS−1i=0 ((N − F − i)/N − i)
or
p = (ΠS−1i=0 (N − F − i))/(ΠS−1i=0 (N − i))
which simplifies to
p = (ΠF−1i=0 (N − S − i))/(ΠF−1i=0 (N − i))
= ΠF−1i=0 ((N − S − i)/(N − i))
≈ ((N − S)/N)F when F  N
= (1− r)F
Hence we can obtain the probability that the sample passes the check (i.e., discovers no
fraud) given F fraudulent ballots, will be approximately (1− r)F .
A table of example confidence levels for sample sizes against number of ballots corrup-
ted is given in Figure A.5.
A table of sample rates to achieve particular confidence levels against number of ballots
corrupted is given in Figure A.6. For example, to achieve a 99% confidence that there
are fewer than 1000 incorrect ballots, it is necessary to check 0.5% of the total number
of ballots.
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Figure A.5.: Confidence levels
Figure A.6.: Percentage sampled to achieve confidence levels
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A.3. Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian analysis is concerned with the way the probability of some occurrence A is
affected by particular observations B. In our case we are interested in the probability
that there are F fraudulent ballots in the case where sampling does not identify any
fraud. Although we do not have a prior probability for fraudulent ballots, we we are still
able to consider how sensitive the resulting probability is to possible prior probabilities.
The calculations above give the probability that the sample passes the check given
there are F fraudulent ballots. Define:
A : there are F fraudulent ballots
B : the sample passes the check
p(A) : the probability of A
p(¬A) : the probability of A being false
p(A|B) : the probability of A given B
Bayes’ theorem states that
p(A|B) = p(B|A).p(A)
p(B|A).p(A) + p(B|¬A).p(¬A) (A.2)
For the worst case analysis we will assume that there are either no cheating (0 fraud-
ulent ballots) or that there are exactly F fraudulent ballots. In other words, if there is
an attack then the attacker chooses exactly the right number to change the result.
We can therefore calculate p = P (A|B), the probability we are interested, given any
particular value of P (A), the prior probability that there has been an attack which altered
F ballots.
The formula in Line A.1 above is Line A.2 with the following substitutions:
• p(B|¬A) = 1 — if no cheating then the probability that the sample passes the
check must be 1.;
• p(B|A) = (1− r)F — given earlier;
• p(A) = q — prior (pre-sampling) probability of an attack. Must be estimated;
• p(A|B) = p — the probability we are interested in.
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